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TEACHING AN OLD POLICY NEW TRICKS:
THE 421-A TAX PROGRAM AND THE FLAWS
OF TRICKLE-DOWN HOUSING
Seth B. Cohen*
INTRODUCTION
In his 1890 tenement housing exposé How The Other Half
Lives, journalist and photographer Jacob Riis remarked:
There are three effective ways of dealing with the
tenements: By law. By remodeling and making the most out
of the old houses. By building new, model tenements.
Private enterprise . . . [m]ust do the lion’s share under these
last two heads . . . [but t]he State may have to bring down
the rents . . . [b]y assuming the right to regulate them . . . .1
Despite decades of legislation, the challenge of affordable
housing remains a hallmark of living for New York City (“City”)
residents who earn low-income wages.2 Riis’ concerns over housing
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2009; B.A., Tufts University, 2000.
Thanks to: the members of the Journal of Law and Policy for their help;
Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation A for the inspiration behind this Note;
Professor David Reiss for his guidance; and Assemblyman Vito Lopez and
Council Member David Yassky for taking time out of their busy schedule to
speak with me. Special thanks to Rebecca Cohen, as well as the Cohen and
Webb families, for their support.
1
JACOB RIIS, HOW T HE OTHER HALF LIVES 223–24 (Courier Dover
Publications 1971) (1890), available at http://www.yale.edu/amstud/inforev/
riis/chap25.html.
2
Various state and federal programs have different definitions of “lowincome.” The federal government generally defines “low-income” as 80% or less
of the Area Median Income (“AMI”). Public Health and Welfare Act § 10, 42
U.S.C. § 12704 (1994). The AMI for the New York City area is currently
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were mainly those of overcrowding and substandard conditions.3
Today, though, unaffordability is the chief concern for housing
advocates.4 Statistics demonstrate the sobering fact of the City’s
high cost of living: At the most general level, New York City
(“City”) is ranked 9th highest in a nationwide survey of monthly
rental costs ($909 per month), but a substantial portion of the
population has difficulty paying their rental bill because the City’s
median household income is only $43,434.5 Additionally, more
than half of City households spend over 30% of their income on
housing,6 but for renters, the situation is even more serious; almost
one-third of all City families that rent their homes spend over 50%
of their income solely on housing.7 For those earning low-income
wages, the problem is only intensified: among this group of renters,
$70,900 for a four-person family; low-income for a four-person family is
approximately $56,700. See DEP’ T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FY2006 NEW
YORK INCOME LIMITS 1, http://www.huduser.org/Datasets/IL/IL06/ny_fy2006
.pdf [hereinafter HUD, N EW Y ORK].
3
See RIIS, supra note 1, at 1.
4
See, e.g., H OUSING HERE AND NOW , LOSING GROUND: HOW MIDDLE
CLASS, W ORKING AND POOR NEW Y ORKERS ARE BEING PRICED OUT 5 (2007),
available
at
http://www.newyorkisourhome.org/LosingGroundReport.pdf.
(“There is no doubt that New York City is in the midst of a housing
affordability crisis.”); OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER, POLICY
BRIEF: OVERVIEW OF SECTION 421-A HOUSING SUBSIDY D ISTRIBUTION 2
(2006), available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/press/pdfs/05-23-06_
policy_brief_421a.pdf. [hereinafter COMPTROLLER, O VERVIEW] (“New York
faces a very serious housing affordability crisis.”).
5
NEW YORK C ITY RENT GUIDELINES BD ., 2007 INCOME AND
AFFORDABILITY STUDY 6 (2007), available at http://www.housingnyc.com/
downloads/research/pdf_reports/ia07.pdf.
6
T HE C ITY OF NEW YORK , PLANYC REPORT 18, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/report_housing.pdf
[hereinafter PLANYC]. “The generally accepted definition of affordability is for a
household to pay no more than 30 percent of its annual income on housing.” See
Housing and Urban Development, Community Planning & Development,
Affordable Housing, http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing (last
visted Apr. 14, 2008).
7
DR. MOON W HA LEE, NEW YORK CITY DEP’ T OF HOUS. P RES. & DEV.,
SELECTED FINDINGS OF THE 2005 NEW YORK C ITY HOUSING AND VACANCY
SURVEY 7 (2005), available at http://www.housingnyc.com/downloads/
research/hvs05/05summary.pdf.
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the majority of their income is devoted to paying rent. 8
Population projections predict an additional 1.2 million New
Yorkers by 2025.9 The City has estimated that an additional
172,000 units of housing, “above the 210,000 already in
development, planned, or being preserved[,]” will be needed just to
meet the demand.10 However, given the current robust housing
market in the City 11 and a rapidly shrinking number of available
affordable apartments,12 the affordable housing crisis will only
continue to get worse without government intervention.
Scholars have identified four basic reasons for national or local
governments to support subsidization of housing rather than
relying on a deregulated housing market:13 First, housing is a “basic
8

AMY ARMSTRONG ET AL ., FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN
POL ’ Y , STATE OF NEW YORK CITY ’S HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS 2006, at
36 (2006), available at http://furmancenter.nyu.edu/SOC2006.htm [hereinafter
FURMAN, H OUSING] (noting that the median rent burden for unsubsidized lowincome renters was 50.4% in 2005).
9
COMPTROLLER, OVERVIEW , supra note 4, at 1. The predicted growth is
largely attributable to continued immigration to the City as well as increased
rates of reproduction. Sam Roberts, Coming Soon, 9 Million Stories in the
Crowded City, N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 19, 2006, § 1, at 33.
10
Ken Fisher, Complex Policy Choices In Managing Growth, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 16, 2007, § 8, col. 1.
11
COMPTROLLER, OVERVIEW , supra note 4, at 1 (“The number of new
housing permits . . . has grown steadily and dramatically [and a] Citywide surge
in market rate housing construction has been accompanied by large increases in
residential . . . property values.”). No doubt, the City is unique in this regard,
as much of the rest of the country is experiencing a housing market slump and
the market in the City has reached a plateau as of late. Diana Cardwell & Ray
Rivera, Long Robust, Gains in New York City Property Values Start to Flatten
Out, N.Y. T IMES, Jan. 16, 2008, at B1. These predictions are based on an
assumption that the demand for housing in the City will continue to rise.
12
PLANYC, supra note 6 (“According to the Furman Center, the number
of apartments affordable to low- and moderate-income New Yorkers shrank by
205,000 units between 2002 and 2005.”). This decline in affordable rentals was
attributed to several factors, including a construction industry lagging behind a
growing population, immigration, and the fact that “much of the new housing
has been for people with higher incomes, and most of it has been for sale, not for
rent.” Janny Scott, Housing Tighter for New Yorkers of Moderate Pay, N.Y.
T IMES, June 16, 2006, at A1.
13
J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure
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human need” that society is morally obliged to help provide;14
second, subsidizing decent affordable housing is a better option
than simply providing public money to eligible recipients;15 third,
the negative externalities on society that come with inadequate
housing are mitigated by subsidization; and fourth, the market
alone will not provide adequate affordable housing.16
The City is no stranger to these rationales for providing public
housing, having long leveraged the law to provide better housing
opportunities for the poor.17 In fact, the City championed the
“nation’s first tenement laws, [its] first comprehensive zoning
ordinance, and [created] its first public housing project.”18
Congress eventually followed the City’s initiative when it enacted
the Public Housing Act of 193719 and the Housing Act of 1949,
which declared “a national policy of ‘a decent home and a suitable
living environment for every American family.’”20 In the face of
federal budget reductions for housing programs,21 however, the
heavy lifting of “housing assistance now is accomplished primarily
through a variety of indirect subsidies moving through state and

and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 529–30
(2007).
14
Id. at 530. The authors note the essential nature of housing as a shelter
against the elements and as a social “center of . . . family life.” Id.
15
Id. Byrne and Diamond note a variety of paternalistic reasons for their
claim, including: mistrust in simply giving recipients public money to use;
creation of a durable community asset; benefits to the dependents of the
recipients; indirect positive affects to the recipient, and the ability for
beneficiaries to put money toward other needs such as education and health. Id.
16
Id. at 530–31. Echoing Jacob Riis, the authors point to such negative
externalities as crime and disease. Id. at 530. Given ever-rising costs in
producing and preserving housing, the market will naturally tend to favor
wealthier individuals in order to offset the production cost and profit from
housing development. Id. at 531.
17
FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL ESTATE & URBAN POL ’ Y , H OUSING POLICY IN
NEW YORK C ITY: A BRIEF HISTORY 1 (2006), available at http://www.
furmancenter.nyu.edu/publications/documents/NYChousingpolicybrief1.pdf.
18
Id.
19
Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 543.
20
Id.
21
Id.
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local governments and private developers.”22
By harnessing federal, state, and local resources, the City has
demonstrated its commitment to ensure affordable housing
development and preservation.23 As part of an ambitious 10-year
plan, the City aims to “[p]reserve 73,000 units of affordable
housing for 220,000 New Yorkers, [including those] where
subsidies are set to expire in the near future[,] and [c]reate 92,000
units of affordable housing for 280,000 New Yorkers.”24 Over the
next ten years, it has been estimated that the City will use $3.2
billion of its own funds to renovate distressed buildings, provide
$500 million in tax-exempt bonds to create and maintain low- and
moderate-income housing, and administer over $1 billion in federal
funds to provide funds for housing cost vouchers, low-income
housing tax credits, and other programs.25 The high levels of
affordable housing the City is pledging to create or preserve,
coupled with significant amounts of money being directed toward
the problem, demonstrate that the City is serious about affordable
housing.
Another non-traditional (and little-analyzed) method that New
York State has used to try to foster affordable housing production
in the City is to entice private developers with tax incentives for
building such units, thus integrating Riis’ propositions. 26 These tax
incentives, named for the Section 421-a of the New York Real
Property Tax Law provision that establishes them, have come to
be known as the 421-a program.27
22

Id.
NEW YORK C ITY DEP’ T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., T HE N EW HOUSING
MARKETPLACE: CREATING HOUSING FOR THE NEXT GENERATION 17 (2004),
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/downloads/pdf/10yearHMplan.pdf.
24
Id. at 3.
25
PRATT CTR. FOR COMMUNITY DEV ., INCREASING HOUSING
OPPORTUNITY IN NEW YORK C ITY: T HE CASE FOR INCLUSIONARY HOUSING 39
(2006), available at http://www.prattcenter.net/pubs/izreport.pdf [hereinafter
PRATT , I NCLUSIONARY].
26
See RIIS, supra note 1, at 223–24. Generally speaking, the 421-a
program was started in 1971 and now grants real-estate developers tax
exemptions on their property in exchange for creating certain levels of affordablehousing. See infra Parts I and II.
27
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 2007).
23
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In August 2007, the 421-a program was reauthorized with
several new amendments. 28 The revised program took effect on
December 28, 2007, and will be reexamined in 2010.29 On his
approval, former Governor Eliot Spitzer announced that the new
legislation “[w]ill . . . [m]ore effectively promote the construction
of affordable housing in the neighborhoods that need it most . . .
[and] will build on our efforts to solve the housing crisis that has
pushed too many working New Yorkers out of the middle class and
prevented those struggling . . . from economic security.”30
As evidenced by the former Governor’s remarks, three
objectives drive the 421-a program.31 Two objectives, “decent
shelter” and “wealth creation” for recipients in the form of lower
rent and retained earnings, remain explicit programmatic objectives;
implicit in the program, though, is a third objective: the “efficient
use of public funds” in terms of balancing the costs, financial and
otherwise, to the public with the benefits. 32 Supporters laud the
new measures as providing vital and innovative tools to increase
the availability of affordable units and meet the increasing
demand.33 Critics, however, question the efficacy of the tax
abatement program altogether and cast the new law as nothing but a
giveaway to developers at the public’s expense.34
28

Press Release, Governor Elliot Spitzer, Governor Spitzer Signs Bill to
Reform NYC Tax Exemption for Housing Development (Aug. 24, 2007),
available at http://www.ny.gov/governor/press/0824072.html [hereinafter
Spitzer].
29
“As required by State law, the changes [made by the City] will go into
effect one year from the effective date of the legislation.” Press Release, Mayor
Michael Bloomberg, Mayor Bloomberg Will Sign Compromise Bill to Reform
421-a Tax Incentive Program Into Law (Dec. 20, 2006), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/pr2006/pr-12-20-06.shtml.
30
Spitzer, supra note 28.
31
Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 531 (“[There are] eight possible
objectives of subsidized housing . . . : 1) decent shelter; 2) wealth creation; 3)
social integration; 4) urban vitality; 5) civic engagement; 6) training; 7)
institution building; and 8) efficient use of public funds.”).
32
Id.
33
See Spitzer, supra note 28.
34
See, e.g., PRATT CTR. FOR COMMUNITY DEV ., U NDERSTANDING THE
NYC “421-A” PROPERTY T AX EXEMPTION PROGRAM 6, available at
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This Note will examine the 421-a program, its intended effects,
and whether the new measures are indeed crafted to increase the
availability of affordable housing and meet the increasing demand
more effectively. Part I presents a history of 421-a legislation,
discusses its evolution over the past four decades, and outlines
what it has accomplished. Part II explores the newly passed
legislation and compares the previous version of 421-a to the
current one. Finally, Part III analyzes the efficacy of the new
program in light of its policy goals. Ultimately, this Note will argue
that while the amended 421-a program contains positive
substantive changes, it nevertheless fails to effectively promote
affordable housing construction and instead continues to grant
incentives for any housing construction.
Other City programs that advance affordable housing
notwithstanding, the 421-a program in a large part retains its
original 1985 framework and its focus on creating incentives for
developers. As a result, scarce public funds will continue to be
used inefficiently: limited “decent shelter” will be constructed, and
“wealth creation”35 for families earning low-income will necessarily
continue to be hampered. Further, the inherent tensions36 and
tradeoffs between the program’s twin goals of housing
development and affordable housing construction, as well as
between its three policy objectives—decent shelter, wealth
creation, and efficient use of public funds—will continue to
undermine the very policies the program purports to serve. These
programmatic imbalances will prevent the 421-a program from
becoming a truly powerful and forward-looking affordable housing
creation mechanism.
http://www.habitatnyc.org/pdf/advocate/Pratt421a.pdf
[hereinafter
PRATT,
UNDERSTANDING]. While the new amendments build on the 421-a program,
these and other critics nevertheless contend that more stringent requirements
regarding affordable housing creation should, and could, have been adopted
without harming the City’s real estate market. See infra Part II.
35
Byrne and Diamond define housing subsidies as “wealth creation”
because they “aim to alleviate poverty [by] transferring resources to the recipient
in the form of less expensive housing rather than cash.” Byrne & Diamond,
supra note 13, at 541.
36
Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 561 (“[T]ensions among goals of
decent housing and other social benefits are endemic in subsidized housing.”).
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HISTORY OF THE 421-A PROGRAM TO 2006
A. The 421-a Program: 1971-1985
1.

Context and Legislation

As originally conceived, the 421-a program had nothing to do
with enhancing affordable housing opportunities.37 When Mayor
John Lindsay received state legislative approval of the first 421-a
provision in 1971,38 New York City was a vastly different place
than it is today. The City was experiencing a weak housing market
and was in the midst of a fiscal crisis.39 It had recently lost close to
90,000 jobs.40 In addition, 1970 marked the beginning of a decadelong population decline that would see more than 10% of its seven
million residents flee.41 Mayor Lindsay’s 421-a program was
37

See N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 1971) (amended
2007). No mention of affordable housing is made in the original legislation.
38
NEW Y ORK CITY DEP’ T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE 421-A TASK F ORCE 1 (2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/
html/hpd/downloads/pdf/421ataskforcereporfinal4.pdf [hereinafter HPD, T ASK
FORCE]. The City’s power to enact local law is “derived from the New York
State Constitution, Article IX, as implemented by, and spelled out in, the
Municipal Home Rule Law.” However, a local law related to a “state concern”
such as housing may not be adopted unless “authorized specifically by the
Municipal Home Rule Law . . . or unless the State Legislature has specifically
granted such power to the City.” NEW YORK STATE DEP’ T OF STATE, REVISING
C ITY CHARTERS IN NEW YORK STATE 3 (2006), available at
http://www.celdf.org/NewYorkHomeRuleandMunicipalGovernment/tabid/295/D
efault.aspx (follow “Revising City Charters” hyperlink) [hereinafter DOS,
REVISING].
39
PRATT CTR. FOR COMMUNITY DEV., REFORMING NEW YORK CITY ’S
421-a PROPERTY T AX EXEMPTION PROGRAM: SUBSIDIZE AFFORDABLE HOMES,
NOT LUXURY DEVELOPMENT 2 (2006), available at http://www.prattcenter.
net/pubs/PrattCenter-NY421-aReport.pdf [hereinafter PRATT, SUBSIDIZE].
40
Emanuel Perlmutter, Metropolitan Area Loses 88,000 Jobs in a Year,
N.Y. T IMES, May 11, 1971, at A1.
41
OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMPTROLLER, POPULATION TRENDS
IN NEW Y ORK S TATE ’S CITIES 7 (2004), available at http://www.osc.state.ny.
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intended as an opt-in program for developers to stimulate
construction during an economic recession by promoting new
construction of any multi-family housing developments through the
use of tax abatements to developers, regardless of whether they
were affordable or market-rate.42
Specifically, new residential construction of multi-family
homes on vacant or underutilized land was granted a full “tax
exemption on the increased value during the period of construction
and for 10 years thereafter.”43 For example, a developer who
purchased property for $1 million and developed a building worth
$10 million on the land would only be taxed on the $1 million initial
investment and not on the $9 million in improvements. 44 One
stipulation of the 421-a program, however, provided benefits to the
public as well: 421-a residential units had to be leased at 85% of
market-rate rents and were subject to rent stabilization for the
duration of the exemption.45 As a result, apartments in a building
developed under the 421-a program could only be leased at a
us/localgov/pubs/research/pop_trends.pdf.
42
HPD, T ASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 1 ( “421-a was initially established
in an environment of declining property values and a dearth of development
activity. The incentive was intended to stimulate new development during a
period of slow housing production and declining population citywide.”). The
program was not mandatory; if a developer determined that it was a better
business decision to build without taking advantage of the 421-a tax incentive,
they could still do so.
43
C ITIZENS HOUSING AND PLANNING COUNCIL, A PROPOSAL TO
ENHANCE T AX AND ZONING INCENTIVES FOR NEW HOUSING PRODUCTION 5
(2002), available at http://www.chpcny.org/pdf/taxincent.pdf [hereinafter CHPC,
ENHANCE]. One generic example of underutilized land is an office or apartment
building that is only at 50% capacity and, as such, is not being used as
efficiently as possible. Jeremy Miller, Filling New York’s ‘Vacancies’, GOTHAM
GAZETTE , Jan. 7, 2008, available at http://www.gothamgazette.com/article/
issueoftheweek/20080107/200/2394.
44
NEW YORK C ITY INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE, IBO FISCAL BRIEF, W ORTH
THE COST ? EVALUATING THE 421-A PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION 2 (2003),
available
at
http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/421aTaxFiscalBrief.pdf
[hereinafter IBO, F ISCAL].
45
Id. at 5. Rent stabilization refers to rent being frozen at a specific amount
for the duration of the tax exemption. See infra notes 106–15 and accompanying
text.
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maximum of 85% of the full market value of the apartment.46
While the original 1971 version of the 421-a program was not
intended to be an engine for affordable housing, it had one implicit
objective similar to that of later versions of the program that were
explicitly focused on affordable housing: the efficient use of public
funds by the balancing of interests involved.47 The original 421-a
program attempted to create more housing in the City and energize
the economy, while at the same time foregoing a certain amount of
tax revenue that would otherwise be collected for public use.48
2.

Tax Abatements and Exemptions

The use of tax abatements (taxes that are incrementally scaled
in) and exemptions (complete tax avoidance) as motivators for
economic development is relatively straightforward: with reduced
or entirely avoided taxes, a significant portion of the costs
associated with developing and managing the property will be
offset, thus inducing developers to build.49 Tax exemptions remove
all tax liability for a given period, while tax abatements encourage
housing production by “providing a declining exemption on the
new value that is created” by the development.50
Under a tax abatement (or “partial tax exemption”) scheme, the
46

N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(1) (McKinney 1971) (amended
2007) (“Rents to be charged upon initial occupancy . . . shall be at least fifteen
percent less than the rents prevailing for comparable [units].”).
47
See Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 531.
48
See PRATT , U NDERSTANDING , supra note 34, at 4.
49
Indeed, tax incentives “have long been a tool to both redistribute wealth
and to inhibit uses or behavior that the government seeks to suppress.” The
Future of Section 421-a of the Real Property Tax Law and Affordable Housing
Development: Public Hearing on REAL PROP . TAX LAW § 421-a Before the
Assembl. Standing Comm. on Housing, 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. 146 (N.Y.
2007) [hereinafter Public Hearing] (statement of Jerilyn Perine, Executive
Director of the Citizens Housing and Planning Council) (on file with the
author).
50
New York City Department of Finance, Tax Reduction & Rebate
Programs, http://home2.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/property/property_tax_reduc_tax
reductions.shtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2008). Thus, by matching such tax
“credits” against tax liabilities, a developer’s overall property tax is reduced. Id.
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taxes that a developer must pay are slowly phased in over a
number of years.51 Abatements are then another way to “ensure
that a property owner’s costs are not increased as a result of the
improvements by deferring the increased property taxes which
result from improvement-related increases in property values.”52
B. 1985–2006: Affordable Housing Production as a
Concurrent Goal of 421-a
Between 1971 and 1984, approximately 200,000 new housing
units were created in the City;53 nine percent of those, or 18,000
apartments, were financed under the 421-a exemption. 54
Notwithstanding the rather limited use of 421-a, there was a
growing consensus that the costs were outweighing the benefits,
rendering the program inefficient.55 First and foremost was the
concern that the tax exemption program was unjustifiably
advantageous to luxury developers and that communities in
Northern Manhattan and the outer boroughs were not benefiting
enough under the law.56 In response, the New York State
Legislature endorsed a 1985 City Council proposal that
transformed the program, thereby grafting another policy goal to
the program’s original objective.57
No longer would 421-a simply encourage new housing
construction in the City; now, it would also “ensure that a portion
51

Id. (“[The 421-a program provides] a declining exemption on the new
value created by the improvement.”).
52
Melvyn R. Durchslag, Property Tax Abatement For Low-Income
Housing: An Idea Whose Time May Never Arrive, 30 H ARV . J. ON LEGIS., 367–
69 (1993).
53
See NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BD ., 2007 HOUSING SUPPLY
REPORT 14 (2007), available at www.housingnyc.com/downloads/research/pdf_
reports/07HSR.pdf [hereinafter 2007 HSR].
54
Under IBO calculations, 421-a has helped finance construction of 87,000
apartments since 1971. Since 1985, roughly 69,000 units were created under
421-a. Thus, between 1971 and 1985, 18,000 units were created under the
program. See IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 1, 4.
55
See PRATT , U NDERSTANDING , supra note 34, at 4.
56
CHPC, ENHANCE , supra note 43, at 5.
57
Id.
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of new[, multifamily] housing [would] be ‘affordable’ to low- and
moderate-income New Yorkers.”58 As a result, 421-a encapsulated
two more objectives traditionally seen in affordable housing
programs—decent shelter (i.e., new or updated apartments), and
wealth creation (i.e., a reduced rent burden), that would be
specifically targeted at families earning low-income wages.59
1.

Defining “Affordable” Housing and “Low-Income”:
Area Median Income

One of the priorities the post-1985 421-a statute advances is
affordable housing production for individuals and families earning
low-income.60 These essential terms, though, are defined in various
ways depending on the particular policy goals of a given program.
Both federal and local determinations of what is “affordable” for a
given locale rely in part on equations involving Area Median
Income (“AMI”), which is calculated by the United States
Department of Housing of Urban Development.61 AMI represents
the median income for a geographic region over a given year,62 and
is used to set maximum income limits for various affordable
housing programs.63
The use and reliance on AMI in the calculations of affordability
will depend on programmatic policy goals. For instance, the federal
government defines “affordable” rent as that which does “not
exceed 30[%] of the adjusted income of a family [of four] whose
income equals 65[%] of the [AMI] for the area.”64 By contrast, the
58

IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 2.
Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 531.
60
IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 2.
61
DEP’ T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FY2007 HUD INCOME LIMITS
BRIEFING MATERIAL 15 (2007), available at http://www.huduser.org/datasets/
il/il07/IncomeLimitsBriefingMaterial.pdf [hereinafter HUD, INCOME].
62
Id. at 8–9.
63
IBO, F ISCAL , supra note 44, at 2–3. This includes the negotiated
certificates developers can elect to purchase through the 421-a program and the
base rents for on-site affordable housing. Id.
64
Cranston-Gonzalez
National
Affordable
Housing
Act,
42
U.S.C. § 12745(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).
59
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City 65 ultimately defined affordable rent for a family of four as not
exceeding 30% of 80% AMI, resulting in less eligible recipients
than the traditional federal definition would have allowed because
of a higher income threshold.66
While the AMI appears to be a straightforward calculation, the
geographic area that it considers has a substantial impact on the
resulting definition of affordability. 67 Significantly, the geographic
region that is used to calculate the City’s AMI includes not only
the five boroughs that comprise the City, but also wealthier
surrounding counties including Nassau, Suffolk, Putnam and
Richmond.68 This boosts the stated AMI for the New York
metropolitan area to $70,900,69 even though in the true median
income in the five boroughs is only $43,434, and even less
depending on particular boroughs or neighborhoods within
boroughs.70
This HUD-defined AMI is a controlling variable in the 421-a
program.71 Since HUD’s AMI calculation is crucial in determining
65

The 421-a program did not specifically define affordability in the law.
The pre-2007 statute merely stated that within certain boundaries, tax incentives
would be granted only if “twenty percent of the units [were] affordable to
families of low and moderate income.” N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(2)
(McKinney 2005); N EW Y ORK CITY , C ODE § 11-245(b)(2) (2006).
66
See IBO, F ISCAL, supra note 44, at 3 (“[F]or the affordable units built in
80/20 projects . . . incomes cannot exceed 80 percent of the area median income,
and rent is set at 30 percent of that ceiling.”).
67
See generally, N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 2007).
For instance, section (7)(c)(i) states that “not less than twenty percent of the
units . . . must . . . be affordable to . . . families whose incomes . . . do not
exceed sixty percent of the area median incomes . . . .” (emphasis added). The
current 421-a statute contains many such references to area median income. §
421-a.
68
DEP’ T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FY2007 AREA DEFINITIONS REPORT
30 (2007), http://www.huduser.org/datasets/il/il07/Area_Definitions_Report.pdf.
69
HUD currently calculates the AMI for the New York City metropolitan
area as $70,900 for a family of four. HUD, NEW YORK , supra note 2.
70
FURMAN, H OUSING , supra note 8, at 3.
71
See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(1)(a)(ii)(C)(b) (McKinney
1985) (amended 2007) (providing that tax exemptions were not available within
certain areas unless the Department of Housing Preservation and Development,
which used the HUD-defined AMI as its benchmark “had certified that twenty
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the maximum allowable income a family can make and still be
eligible for 421-a rent stabilized apartments, the HUD definition of
“low-income” becomes a fundamental variable as well.72 HUD
defines “low-income households” as those households that do not
earn more than 80% of the median family income for a four-person
family.73 Thus, “low-income” for the City, and for the 421-a
program, is currently calculated to be $56,700.74 As noted above,
though, this low-income calculation inaccurately reflects the reality
in the City because it takes into account wealthier surrounding
areas.
2.

The 421-a Program: 1985-2006

Two substantive elements particularly distinguished the 1985
law and its subsequent amendments from the original 421-a plan
and illustrated the Legislature’s shift from merely encouraging
market rate housing projects to specifically stimulating affordable
development. First was the creation of the Geographic Exclusion
Area (“exclusion zone”), an area within which developers seeking
to build had to meet additional requirements tied to affordable
housing production in order to be eligible for a tax benefit. 75 Second
was the correlation of the duration of the tax exemption to specific
percent of the units [would] be affordable to families of low and moderate
income”).
72
Id. The same holds true for more recent versions of the 421-a program.
See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(1) (McKinney 2007)
(“[Providing no tax incentives in certain areas unless] twenty percent of the
units in the multiple dwelling must . . . be affordable to and occupied or
available for occupancy by individuals or families whose incomes at the time of
initial occupancy do not exceed sixty percent of the area median incomes
adjusted for family size . . . .”).
73
HUD, I NCOME, supra note 61, at 1.
74
“Very-low-income” is defined as not exceeding 50% of the AMI. HUD,
INCOME , supra note 61, at 1. Given the City AMI, “very low-income” is
currently $35,450 for a family of four. HUD, N EW Y ORK, supra note 2, at 1.
75
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7) (McKinney 2007) (“[B]enefits of
this section shall not be available for new multiple dwellings located in a
geographic exclusion area . . . unless they comply with the provisions of this
subdivision . . . .”).
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area, thereby creating greater incentives for developers to develop
housing in certain locations over others. 76
a. Geographic Exclusion Area—On-Site Development or
Negotiable Certificates
To ensure that developers did not simply develop under the
421-a program in areas with the highest market-rate value,
legislators sectioned off an area within which developers could not
take advantage of 421-a “as-of-right,” referred to as the “exclusion
zone.”77 Certain restrictions were applied to developers looking to
build within that area to ensure that any developments in the
exclusion zone would add a net benefit to the goal of affordable
housing. The exclusion zone encompassed approximately the
middle portion of Manhattan and was comprised of neighborhoods
that were traditionally strong housing markets in the City. 78 The
exclusion zone was roughly circumscribed by Ninety-Sixth Street
as the northern boundary, Fourteenth Street as the southeastern
boundary, and Houston Street as the southwestern boundary. 79
Outside the exclusion zone, developers were still granted tax
incentives as-of-right—whether or not they built affordable
housing units—and rent was generally set by the market-rate for
the area.80 Within the exclusion zone, though, developers were no
longer granted benefits “as-of-right,” but instead had to meet one of
two conditions in order to take advantage of the tax benefits: either
76

Between 1985 and 2006, the New York State Legislature made several
technical revisions to the 421-a program. However, the basic framework of the
law remained largely unchanged. Where substantive changes were made post1985, those changes will be addressed. See CHPC, ENHANCE, supra note 43, at
5.
77
See N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7) (McKinney 2007).
78
HPD, T ASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 2.
79
Department of Housing Preservation and Development 421-a Geographic
Exclusion Zone Map, available at www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/downloads/pdf/421aGEA-Final.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2008) [hereinafter GEA Map].
80
HPD, T ASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 2. Areas outside of the exclusion
zone were not as potentially lucrative as areas within the zone given market-rates
for the middle section of Manhattan were generally higher than that of upper
Manhattan and the outer boroughs. Id.
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designating one-fifth of on-site units as affordable for individuals
and families earning low-income wages,81 or contributing to
affordable housing elsewhere by purchasing negotiable certificates
from off-site affordable housing developers, in effect “buying” the
tax incentive.82 Since the total amount of subsidies a developer
could accumulate was unlimited,83 an exclusion zone developer
could hypothetically accumulate enough certificates to completely
offset their development.84
Under the first, on-site option, developers building under 421-a
had to set aside 20% of the units in the development to families
earning no more than $56,700.85 Additionally, developers could
only charge $17,010 per year in rent for those affordable units. 86
Under the second, negotiable certificate option,87 market-rate
developers seeking to build only market-rate units within the
exclusion zone could purchase transferable real estate tax abatement
certificates from affordable housing developers building outside the
exclusion zone.88 This negotiable certificate option allowed marketrate developers within the exclusion zone to indirectly increase the
City’s affordable housing stock by financing the construction of
affordable housing units in other parts of the City, outside the
81

This conditional incentive is also known as an “80/20” marketrate/affordable-rate mix; 20% of the units must be marketed to those earning lowincome wages, while the other 80% can be market-rate. PRATT , SUBSIDIZE ,
supra note 39, at 3. Slightly different conditions apply to the GreenpointWilliamsburg exclusion areas. HPD, T ASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 4.
82
IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 3.
83
COMPTROLLER, O VERVIEW , supra note 4, at 3.
84
See HPD, T ASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 6.
85
This $56,700 benchmark currently represents 80% AMI. N.Y. REAL
PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(2)(b) (McKinney 2005); HUD, NEW YORK , supra
note 2, at 1.
86
See IBO, F ISCAL , supra note 44, at 3. Yearly rent was limited to
$17,010 in those affordable units because the yearly rent could not exceed 30%
of the low-income threshold of $56,700. Id.
87
This program is known as the Affordable Housing Program (“AHP”).
NEW YORK CITY DEP’ T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV ., OVERVIEW OF 421-A
PROGRAMS (2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/downloads/pdf/
421aoverviewtfreport.pdf [hereinafter HPD, O VERVIEW].
88
See HPD, T ASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 4.
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exclusion zone.89
Affordable housing developers outside of the exclusion zone
used the proceeds of the certificate sales to generate construction
capital for their own projects. 90 The number of certificates a
market-rate developer could obtain from an affordable housing
developer was dictated by the particular AMI ceiling for the
particular affordable housing project. 91 In return for helping to fund
affordable housing projects outside the exclusion zone, each
purchased certificate allowed a market-rate developer to receive the
benefits of the tax incentives provided by the 421-a program on
one new, market-rate apartment within the exclusion zone, without
being impeded by rent regulations.92 Over the life of the tax
abatement, the certificate was “worth, on average, over $100,000
in . . . tax benefits to [the developer for] each market-rate unit in
the exclusion zone.”93 In this way, developers derived benefits not
only from abated property taxes, but also from higher-fetched
rental prices because they did not have to set aside on-site
affordable units.94
Given the lucrative market inside the exclusion zone, many
market-rate real estate developers decried this innovation in
particular because they saw it as encroaching on their assumed as-

89

Id.
See PRATT , SUBSIDIZE , supra note 39, at 4; IBO, F ISCAL, supra note
44, at 2–3.
91
Non-exclusion area units rented to families earning 60% AMI ($42,540)
yielded five certificates for market-rate developers, whereas units rented to
families earning between 60% and 100% AMI yielded only four certificates.
HPD, O VERVIEW , supra note 87.
92
HPD, T ASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 8. Essentially, each certificate
bought by the market-rate developer permitted him to develop one market-rate
unit within the exclusion zone while still receiving the tax benefits under 421-a.
Market-rate developers had the opportunity to purchase varying amounts of
certificates depending on the type of affordable housing that was being indirectly
financed. Id.
93
Id. “The certificate program thus leverages only between 15% and 20%
of the value of the tax benefit for affordable housing.” Id. at 8.
94
Peter Iverson, Linking 421a to Low-Income Housing, N.Y. T IMES, Dec.
17, 1989, § 10, at 1.
90
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of-right ability to develop.95 Before the 1985 amendments were
enacted, the President of the Real Estate Board of New York
fretted, “Almost no rental buildings would be constructed [under
the plan because it will] stop what little rental housing is being
produced . . . . Almost all the rental housing being produced is
within the [proposed exclusion zone].”96
Nevertheless, the exclusion zone provision was approved.
Because the vast majority of all 421-a subsidies were provided to
high-end developments below 96th Street, “the city need[ed] to
focus its attention on how to encourage [low-income unit]
construction . . . . There [were] huge areas in the other boroughs
that need[ed] housing” and an exclusion zone was able to help meet
that need.97 Indeed, the exclusionary zone gained favor as it
continued, enough so that almost twenty years later, it was further
expanded to include other quickly gentrifying areas such as the
Greenpoint-Williamsburg waterfront in Brooklyn and Hudson
Yards.98
b. Duration of Tax Incentives Correlated to Geographic Area
In addition to the creation of the exclusion zone, the post-1985
amendments also extended the duration of the tax incentive period,
but the length of the additional period would depend on the section
of the City in which construction occurred.99 These provisions
95

The developers’ basic contention was that the exclusion zone under 421a would necessarily “dampen development if they reduce developer return
expectations below certain thresholds so that developers choose to abstain from
building or are unable to obtain financing to permit development.” JERRY J.
SALAMA, MICHAEL H. SCHILL & JONATHAN SPRINGER, FURMAN CTR. FOR
REAL ESTATE & URBAN POL ’ Y , REDUCING THE COST OF NEW HOUSING
CONSTRUCTION IN NEW YORK CITY : 2005 UPDATE , at 100 (2005), available at
http://furmancenter.nyu.edu/CREUP_Papers/cost_study_2005/CostStudy_intro.
html.
96
The Week In Review, A Debate; The Controversy Over Tax Breaks,
N.Y. T IMES, Oct. 21 1984, § 4, at 6.
97
Id. (quoting Ruth Messinger, City Council Member).
98
HPD, T ASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 4.
99
See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW §§ 421-a(1)(a)(ii)(C); 421a(1)(a)(iii)(C) (McKinney 1985) (providing for various exemption periods
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effectively encouraged developers to develop more general housing
in the outer boroughs in exchange for longer extended tax-exempt
periods in order to recoup more of their initial development
money.100
Specifically, inside the exclusion zone, developers building 20%
affordable housing units on-site would receive a twenty-year
abatement.101 Those developers who chose instead to build marketrate units within the exclusion zone and purchase off-site
negotiable certificates would receive a shorter, ten-year
abatement.102 However, those builders outside of the exclusion
zone would reap even more benefits. In most of the rest of the
City, including areas north of 110th Street in Manhattan, the
Bronx, Brooklyn,103 Queens or Staten Island, developers would
receive a fifteen-year as-of-right tax abatement for any housing
construction.104 Further, if developers included 20% affordable
housing units north of 110th Street or in the outer boroughs, they
were eligible for an extended twenty-five year tax abatement.105

depending on the location of the development).
100
Id.
101
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(2)(a)(iv) (McKinney 2005);
PRATT , SUBSIDIZE, supra note 39, at 4. This created an all-or-nothing incentive
for developers in that they could only take advantage of the 421-a tax exemption
by building 20% affordable housing.
102
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(2)(a)(i) (McKinney 2005); PRATT,
SUBSIDIZE , supra note 39, at 2.
103
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(2)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2005). With
the exception of the Greenpoint-Williamsburg waterfront. PRATT , SUBSIDIZE ,
supra note 39, at 4.
104
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(2)(a)(iii) (McKinney 2005);
PRATT , SUBSIDIZE, supra note 39, at 4. The loopholes inherent in the
negotiable certificate system, see infra notes 125–36 and accompanying text,
created a situation where developers were able to take advantage of tax benefits
without significantly increasing the stock of affordable housing. Although the
system likely could have been revised to be made effective, it was nevertheless
cut from the 421-a program in 2007. See infra notes 190–200 and accompanying
text.
105
PRATT , SUBSIDIZE , supra note 39, at 4.
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c. Rent Stabilization

While the goal of the post-1985 amendments was to increase
affordable housing in the City, the amendments did nothing to
regulate the pricing of permanent housing.106 Rentals, however,
were stringently regulated: all initial rents for rental units built
within the exemption period, whether affordable or not, were based
on area market-value.107 To ensure that eligible families could afford
monthly rent, affordable units within the exclusion zone were
further regulated so that rents could not exceed 30% of 80%
AMI.108 For example, if rent for a market-rate apartment in the
exclusion zone was $3,000 per month, or $36,000 per year, then
rent for a 421-a affordable unit in the same zone could not exceed
30% of the low-income threshold ($56,700, representing 80%
AMI), or $1,417 per month.
After the end of the tax abatement period, developers had more
freedom to increase rent for market-rate units than for the
affordable units. 109 As tax abatements were slowly being phased
out, developers were allowed to increase rent on market-rate units
by 2.2% each year.110 Once any given developer lost his tax
incentive, however, and had to begin paying increased taxes, rent
was no longer stabilized by the government, and could immediately
rise to actual market rate.111
While affordable units were more protected even after a
developer exhausted their tax incentive period, they were not
wholly insulated from increased rent. 112 Developers were free to
incrementally increase the rent of affordable units to market rate
106

Id. Specifically, there were no limits on the price for those purchasing
apartments in newly built condominiums or co-ops. Id.
107
CHPC, ENHANCE , supra note 43, at 10.
108
Id.
109
IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 2 (“As exemptions expire, rents may
rise to market rates.”).
110
CHPC, ENHANCE , supra note 43, at 10.
111
Id.
112
See IBO, F ISCAL , supra note 44, at 2 (“[U]nits designated as affordable
remain rent stabilized for at least 20 years, [but] rents may only be increased to
market rates upon vacancy.”).
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only after the given tax exemption ran its course—and the length of
the rent stabilization was dependent on the occupants of such
apartments.113 Specifically, if the unit was built after Fiscal Year
1985 had started, rent stabilization “continue[d] until the end of
the last lease signed while the benefit period was in effect.”114 If the
unit was built before Fiscal Year 1985, though, rent stabilization
“continue[d] until the first vacancy occurs after the expiration of
the tax benefits, even if the vacancy occurs long after the tax
benefits have expired.”115
4.

Gauging 421-a’s Accomplishments: 1985–2006

While the goals of the revised 421-a plan were ambitious, the
lack of any systematic data regarding the outcomes of the 421-a
program makes it difficult to evaluate its effects from 1985 to
2006.116 Based on the available information, however, it appears
that while the program certainly encouraged new housing
production in general, it was not as successful in accomplishing its
second, more crucial goal of providing additional affordable
housing.
a. Overall New Housing Production
Between 1985 and 2006, approximately 260,500 housing units
were developed throughout the City. 117 Of these new units,
approximately 92,000, or 35%, were built under the various 421-a
113

See New York City Rent Guidelines Board, http://www.housingnyc.
com/html/resources/zip.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2008). For example, if an
affordable unit was built in 1988 in an area with a 20-year tax abatement period,
rent was frozen until 2008 plus any additional time that was created by a lease
signed within that abatement period. As soon as the lease ended, though, the
developer was permitted to incrementally increase the rent to 2008 market-rate
prices. As a result, the families living in such apartments at the end of a tax
abatement period would experience rising rent. See id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
See PRATT , I NCLUSIONARY , supra note 25, at 39.
117
See 2007 HSR, supra note 53, at 14. This figure represents a sizeable
increase in the housing stock of the City. Id.
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programs; the other 65% were built without utilizing the
program.118 Developers choose not to build under 421-a for various
reasons. Oftentimes, they were ineligible under the program
because of where, or what, they were building.119 Others simply
chose not to build under 421-a for economic reasons.120 While it is
impossible to determine how many developers would have built in
the absence of the program, the program’s maximum effectiveness
in terms of sheer unit creation reached its peak in 1988.121
Subsequent effectiveness fell substantially in the late-1980s and
1990s, largely in part to a declining real estate market in the
City. 122 Although this trend reversed and there was considerable
rejuvenation in both the housing market in general and in 421-a
development specifically in the late 1990s and early 2000s,123 the
program was once again on the decline by 2005.124
b. Affordable Housing Creation
Of the 92,000 units created under 421-a, only a small fraction
of these were found to be affordable.125 One study found that
between 1985 and 2002, “only 8% (4,905) of the . . . units
118

See id. at 16.
PRATT , SUBSIDIZE , supra note 39, at 7. For example, if a developer was
only building market-rate units in the exclusion zone and was not interested in
the negotiable certificate program, or if a developer was building a parking lot,
they each would not be eligible for incentives under the 421-a program. Id.
120
Id. For example, a developer could determine that he could make more
money simply from charging market-rate rents than from receiving tax benefits
for setting aside affordable units or purchasing negotiable certificates.
121
NEW YORK C ITY RENT GUIDELINES BD ., 1997 HOUSING SUPPLY
REPORT 4 (1997), available at http://www.housingnyc.com/downloads/research/
pdf_reports/97hsr.pdf.
122
NEW YORK C ITY RENT G UIDELINES BD ., RENT STABILIZED H OUSING
IN NEW YORK CITY : A S UMMARY OF RENT GUIDELINES BOARD RESEARCH 64
(1991), available at http://www.housingnyc.com/downloads/research/pdf_
reports/91book.pdf.
123
2007 HSR, supra note 53, at 13.
124
Id. at 16.
125
See 2007 HSR, supra note 53, at 14; PRATT , SUBSIDIZE, supra note
39, at 6.
119
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subsidized through the 10-, 15- or 20-year 421-a
programs . . . were affordable to low-or moderate-income
families.”126 Even those “affordable units” created under the
program were still out of reach for many financially limited families
given the program’s definitions and calculations of affordability.127
Moreover, the difficulty of ensuring affordable unit creation may
be explained by the availability and prevalence of negotiable
certificates, as well as loopholes in the program that worked to the
advantage of developers. 128
Within the exclusion zone, developers were much more likely
to purchase negotiable certificates than to designate 20% of their
on-site units affordable.129 Choosing otherwise would have in effect
limited the rent in those units, and thus driven down profit. The
certificates allowed developers to maximize profits by charging
market-rate rents in all units while still benefiting from a 10-year
tax exemption on some of their units. 130 As sound as these business
decisions may have been, however, they hardly increased the
City’s affordable housing stock in a substantive way. While some
28,000 market rate units built within the exclusion zone benefited
from a 10-year 421-a exemption from 1985 to 2006, only
approximately 5,500 affordable housing units were created outside
the exclusion zone with the revenue generated from purchased
negotiable certificates.131
Moreover, there was simply more business incentive for
market-rate developers. The benefits that market-rate developers
gained, as opposed to those for off-site affordable-housing
126

PRATT , SUBSIDIZE , supra note 39, at 6. “Insufficient data is available
on the 25-year exemption to determine affordability.” Id.
127
See supra notes 60–74 and accompanying text.
128
See HPD, T ASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 8 (“[Negotiable certificates
narrowed] participation in the affordable housing market and [led to a less]
efficient allocation of limited resources.”).
129
Indeed, in 2005, the 80/20 program created 2,100 affordable housing
units in the exclusion zone, while almost 7,700 units were created outside the
exclusion zone with negotiable certificates. COMPTROLLER, OVERVIEW , supra
note 4, at 3–4.
130
See PRATT , SUBSIDIZE , supra note 39, at 5.
131
HPD, T ASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 8.
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developers, were highly skewed. Market-rate developers stood to
realize five to ten times more benefits for simply purchasing
negotiable certificates than any off-site affordable-housing
developers could gain in terms of raising capital; prices for the
certificates ranged from $11,000 to $20,000,132 yet in practice, one
certificate was “worth, on average, over $100,000 in . . . tax
benefits to [the developer for] each market-rate unit in” the
exclusion zone.”133 As a result, the certificate program in fact only
generated approximately one-fifth of the total value of the tax
benefit to affordable housing projects. 134
While the majority of developers within the exclusionary zone
therefore preferred to take advantage of the certification option,
some developers chose instead to receive 20-year tax incentives by
designating 20% of on-site units as affordable: from 1992 to 2003,
6,782 units were created in the exclusion zone under this plan.135
Nevertheless, the choice between on-site units or off-site financing
often came down to simple economics: since “market rents [often]
exceed[ed] the allowable rent for affordable units, even including
the property tax exemption” for the entire project, it usually made
more business sense to opt for financing off-site affordable
housing.136
c. 421-a Unit and Subsidy Concentration
Further issues with 421-a are illustrated by the concentration of
units in Manhattan built under the program. This concentration of
units also resulted in a concentration of benefits to one borough.
While a concentration of units is not necessarily harmful, it was
decidedly not beneficial to those living in the outer boroughs.137
132

Id.
Id.
134
Id.
135
See IBO, F ISCAL , supra note 44, at 3–4.
136
Id. at 4.
137
The disproportionate distribution of benefits was arguably detrimental to
the outer boroughs because the 421-a program did not provide a comparable
amount of units or value of tax benefits to those living in the outer boroughs.
See COMPTROLLER, O VERVIEW , supra note 4, at 3.
133
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From 1985 to 2002, projects in Manhattan accounted for 53%
(36,668) of the total number of all units, affordable and marketrate, built under 421-a, with the other 47% distributed throughout
the other four boroughs.138 By 2005, Manhattan developments had
received “78% of all 421-a benefits but accounted for only 48% of
units that received 421-a benefits.”139 Put simply, Manhattan
developers were receiving the lion’s share of tax benefits under the
program, even though their developments were disproportionately
market-rate developments. Moreover, since developers could
benefit from unlimited levels of 421-a tax incentives, 421-a
developments in Manhattan also received the largest yearly 421-a
subsidies, including some as high as $160,000 per unit.140 This
trend was not only due to higher land costs in Manhattan relative
to the other boroughs, but more importantly because the tax
incentives were being used to subsidize large luxury units. 141 The
outer boroughs, in contrast, saw only a fraction of subsidies as
compared to Manhattan, and far fewer units were created in the
outer boroughs as well.142
Outside of the exclusion zone, 421-a developments were
mostly found to be concentrated in areas with rapidly growing
populations, increasingly affluent socio-economic populations, or
where there were “strong residential real estate markets”—or
combinations of the above.143 Thus, while certain select pockets in
138

Queens realized 20% (13,909); Brooklyn realized 13%; (9,018); Staten
Island realized 7.8% (5,405); and the Bronx realized only 5.5% (3,906). IBO,
FISCAL, supra note 44, at 4.
139
COMPTROLLER, O VERVIEW , supra note 4, at 2.
140
Id. at 3 (“[P]er unit savings [in Trump World Tower] ranged as high as
$160,000” and that such “deeply-subsidized [luxury] units had a market value of
$4.2 billion.”).
141
Id. at 2.
142
Id. at 2–3. For example, in 2005, Manhattan received 78%
($2,069,495,023) of the total 421-a exemption benefits for that yearalmost four
times that of the other boroughs combined. In contrast, Brooklyn received the
second-largest total 421-a exemption benefitsa mere 9% ($238,216,222).
Queens, the Bronx, and Staten Island combined only received 13% of the
benefits ($331,711,530). Id.
143
Such areas included: Flushing, Queens, Greenpoint-Willimsburg,
Brooklyn and Brighton Beach, Brooklyn. Id. at 3.
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the outer boroughs benefited, low-income neighborhoods and the
outer boroughs on the whole saw little increase in affordable
housing under the 421-a program.144 Indeed, at least one
commentator mused that the program was “far from trailblazing”
and was “merely gilding a well-traveled road.”145
d. Average Base Rent Under 421-a
Yet another exposed flaw of the 421-a program was the fact
that “affordable” apartments under 421-a were not always
affordable to those the law intended to target. While there is scant
data as to the extent of “affordability” of apartments built under
421-a, one study estimated the average rents for a one-bedroom
421-a apartment built over a three-year span, 1999 through
2001.146 In the year of the study, AMI for the City was $62,800;
low-income (80% AMI) was $50,250.147 The study showed that in
Manhattan (primarily in the exclusion zone), the average initial
base monthly rent for a 421-a market-rate one-bedroom apartment
built within that timeframe was $3,172.148 Assuming a household
spends 30% of its annual income on rent, this translates in to a
“necessary annual income” of $126,864—225% above the AMI. 149
Indeed, since four out of five apartments built in the exclusion zone
could be rented at market rate, these expensive apartments
represented the vast majority of those receiving subsidies in the
exclusion zone under 421-a.150 In essence, even though some
affordable units were created within the exclusion zone or through
144

Id.
PRATT , SUBSIDIZE , supra note 39, at 9. The contention was that the
421-a program was in fact benefiting and encouraging a continued increase in
market-rate housing rather than promoting affordable housing. Id.
146
See IBO, F ISCAL , supra note 44, at 5.
147
DEP’ T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV ., HUD INCOME LIMITS 2002, at 1
(2002), available at http://www.huduser.org/intercept.asp?loc=/Datasets/IL/
FMR02/hud02ny.pdf [hereinafter HUD INCOME LIMITS 2002].
148
IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 5.
149
Id.
150
Only 20%, or 1 out of 5, on-site units were required to be affordable in
order to receive the 20-year exemption. See N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421a(2)(a)(iv) (McKinney 2005) (amended 2007).
145
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negotiable certificates, the program essentially ensured that
developers could maximize their profits by seeking market-rate
rents while simultaneously receiving tax benefits. 151
Given the $50,250 low-income threshold at the time of the
study, monthly rent in a 421-a low-income apartment in
Manhattan was approximately $1,256.152 This monthly rent would
translate to a necessary annual income of $50,240—99% AMI. In
short, these apartments would only be affordable for a family
earning AMI, not to those families earning 80% AMI, let alone less
than that. Moreover, since at most only one out of five exclusion
zone 421-a apartments had such reduced rents, exclusion zone
units such as these were likely few and far between.153
Outside the exclusion zone under the 15- and 25-year
exemptions, average rents for 421-a apartments were substantially
lower.154 Even here, though, they were rarely affordable for families
earning low income given that the initial rents were tied to the
market rate for the area.155 As a result, the outer boroughs also
generally showed that the program touted to create significant
affordable housing was not living up to its potential. In Brooklyn,
151

See PRATT , U NDERSTANDING , supra note 34, at 4 (noting that the 421a program has only created a small amount of subsidized housing while 421-a
benefits have “covered the boom of market-rate, luxury buildings in lower
Manhattan . . . downtown Brooklyn, and Long Island City with little or no
affordable units”).
152
This approximate rent was found by making the following calculations:
30% of 80% AMI ($50,250) = $15,075; as divided over 12 months =
$1,256.25. See IBO, FISCAL , supra note 44, at 5; HUD INCOME LIMITS 2002,
supra note 147, at 1.
153
IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 3. As data for 2002 shows, 10,879 units
received tax exemptions within the exclusion zone in Manhattan under 421-a;
4,097 units received 10-year exemptions (i.e., through negotiable certificates);
6,782 received 20-year exemptions. Id. Assuming that none of the 10-year
exempt units were renting at “affordable” rates, and developers only designated
the statutory minimum of 20% of their 20-year exempt units as “affordable,”
only 1,356 (12%) of these units were developed as affordable apartments. See id.
154
This is because market rates for areas outside of the central core of
Manhattan are lower. See NEW YORK C ITY RENT GUIDELINES BD., 2007
INCOME AND EXPENSE STUDY 7 (2007), available at http://www.housingnyc.
com/downloads/research/pdf_reports/ie07.pdf.
155
See IBO, F ISCAL , supra note 44, at 5.
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the average monthly rent for a 421-a subsidized unit ($2,077)
translated into a necessary annual income of 147% AMI; the same
apartment in Queens required a necessary annual income of 85%
AMI.156 Since these units fall outside of the exclusion zone, there
was no requirement that any be affordable to families earning lowincome wages, even though developers nevertheless benefited from
the tax abatements. 157 Only in the Bronx did average 421-a
apartment rent prices even come close to being affordable—the
average monthly 421-a apartment rent was $477, or 34% of the
necessary annual income.158 Since market rates still determined the
rent for 421-a units, many apartments were out of range for
precisely those that the program was purportedly designed to
benefit.
e. Cost to Taxpayers of the 421-a Program (Tax Expenditure)
As noted above, the basic economic principle behind the 421-a
program is that a developer receives a tax exemption for every unit
or building created under the program.159 The other side of this
coin, though, is that the City foregoes what yearly property taxes
it otherwise would have collected for every unit built under 421a.160 From 2001 through 2006, 421-a subsidies cost the City nearly
$1.5 billion in tax expenditures.161 In 2006 alone, 421-a subsidies
cost the City over $500 million in unrealized property taxes,
resulting in the largest real estate tax expenditure program that
year.162 Given the amount of benefits developers were receiving as
156

Id.
See N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(2)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2005)
(any project in the outer boroughs is eligible for an as-of-right 15-year
exemption).
158
Id.
159
See supra notes 37–48 and accompanying text.
160
Id.
161
See THE C ITY OF NEW YORK DEP’ T OF FIN . OFFICE OF T AX POL ’ Y ,
ANNUAL REPORTS ON TAX EXPENDITURES FISCAL YEARS 2001 THROUGH 2007,
available at http://home2.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/pub/pub_reports_other_tax.
shtml.
162
Approximately 75,800 apartments received tax subsidies under the
program in 2006. T HE C ITY OF NEW Y ORK DEP’ T OF FIN. OFFICE OF TAX
157
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compared to the amount of affordable housing produced, questions
gradually began to emerge as to whether the costs of the program
were outweighing the benefits, and, if so, how to best revise the
program in order to realign it with its goals.
II. AMENDING THE 421- A PROGRAM: ENACTED LEGISLATION IN
2007
In light of the City’s burgeoning population, strong housing
market, and the need for more affordable housing for families
earning low-income wages, it became apparent that the 421-a
program had to change.163 Public funds were still being used
inefficiently. 164 Wealth was being created, though not necessarily
for the intended recipients of the program.165 While more housing
was indeed being created, the second policy goal of 421-a—
providing affordable housing—was still out of reach, and
accordingly, the need for an overhaul of the 421-a program became
evident by 2006.166
A. Proposals for Change—Four Perspectives
Recognizing this need, Mayor Bloomberg assembled a task
force in early 2006 to explore potential options for reforming the
program.167 Around the same time, several housing advocacy notfor-profit organizations simultaneously began to independently
lobby for progressive proposals to the 421-a program in hopes of
influencing the pending City legislation.
POL ’ Y , A NNUAL REPORT ON T AX EXPENDITURES FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 20–21
(2007), available at http://home2.nyc.gov/html/dof/html/pdf/07pdf/ter_2007_
final_rev12-28-07.pdf.
163
See HPD, T ASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 1 (“[T]he environment for
housing development has changed dramatically. Our robust housing market
provides an historic opportunity to strengthen the connection between the 421-a
program and the development of affordable housing.”).
164
See supra notes 132–45, 159–61 and accompanying text.
165
See supra notes 146–58 and accompanying text.
166
Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 531.
167
HPD, T ASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 1.
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1.

Citizens Housing and Planning Council of New York

One such organization was the Citizens Housing and Planning
Council of New York (“CHPC”). For several years, CHPC168 had
called for a variety of substantive changes to the 421-a program and
to zoning laws in general in order to spur affordable housing
creation.169 CHPC contended that requiring, at minimum, 20% of
on-site apartments in the exclusion zone be affordable created an
inflexible system that failed to persuade developers to provide
anything more than 20% because developers stood to gain no extra
benefit.170 Moreover, CHPC argued that a freeze on eligibility
requirements for on-site exclusion zone affordable apartments at
“no more than 80%” AMI prevented developers from “tap[ping]
the huge market [of] households earning above 80% [AMI] but
below what is necessary to rent new market-rate apartments.”171
Instead, CHPC recommended creating a more adaptable program
by instituting a “sliding scale of set-aside percentages and tenant
[income] eligibility limits.”172 In effect, this change would
encourage developers to build more affordable housing units
168

Citizens Housing and Planning Council “is a non-profit policy research
organization dedicated to improving housing and neighborhood conditions
through cooperative efforts of the public and private sectors.” Citizens Housing
and Planning Council, http://www.chpcny.org/ (last visited, Apr. 14, 2008).
169
The Inclusionary Housing Program “combines a zoning floor area bonus
with a variety of housing subsidy programs to create powerful incentives for the
development and preservation of affordable housing. Developers [must] devote at
least 20 percent of their residential floor area to [permanently affordable] housing”
to maximize the incentives under the program. Int. 487, Dec. 11, 2006.
http://webdocs.nyccouncil.info/attachments/75428.htm (last visited Apr. 14.
2008) (citing NEW YORK C ITY DEP’ T OF CITY PLANNING , NEW YORK CITY
ZONING: INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAM, available at http://home.nyc.
gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zh_inclu_housing.shtml).
170
CHPC, ENHANCE , supra note 43, at 8.
171
Id. While there is no specific data to show exactly how many families
fall into this range, data shows that approximately 820,000 City families fall
into the census income bands between $50,000 and $99,000. US Census
Bureau, American Factfinder 2006 for New York City, http://factfinder.
census.gov (type “New York City” in City/Town/Zip box, follow the “show
more” hyperlink next to Economic Characteristics) (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
172
CHPC, ENHANCE , supra note 43, at 8.
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because it would reward developers with more tax incentives if
they chose to build over the statutory floor of 20%.173
2.

Housing Here and Now

In a similarly progressive vein, Housing Here and Now
(“HHN”)174 called for the exclusion zone to be expanded to
encompass the entire City, thus revoking any as-of-right tax
incentives for developers and instead obligating developers to
provide on-site affordable low- and moderate-income housing if
they wanted tax incentives.175 Moreover, the coalition called for “at
least 30% of the units [to] be affordable for families earning up to
50% of area median income.”176 Under this proposal, not only
would more affordable units be created, but more of those units
would effectively go to families who earned less money.177
Furthermore, HHN urged that any developers who declined to
build any affordable housing would have their taxes directed to the
173

Id. For example, the CHPC-proposed scale would allow developers
electing to create 40% of their units as affordable units would be permitted to
increase the maximum average household income of renters up from 100% to
120%. As a result, while more affordable units would be created, developers
could recoup the cost by renting other units to those with higher incomes. Id.
174
Housing Here and Now is a “coalition of affordable housing groups,
labor unions, AIDS activists, churches and community groups [who] have
joined together to demand that our leaders guarantee housing for ALL New
Yorkers.” Housing Here and Now, http://www.housinghereandnow.org (last
visited Apr. 14, 2008).
175
HOUSING HERE AND NOW , RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM OF THE
421-A PROGRAM (2006), available at http://www.housinghereandnow.org/
policy_421a.html (click on link below “421-a Housing Here and Now
Recommendations (July 26, 2006)”).
176
Id.
177
This is because more units would be available for those families earning
less than $35,450. See id. HHN also advocated for incentives for developers who
dedicated 100% of their units to affordable housing for families earning moderateincome. Id. A “moderate-income” family is generally defined as one that earns
between 80% and 120% AMI, which currently equates to between $56,720 and
$85,080. See COMMUNITY PLANNING BD . 12, AFFORDABLE H OUSING
DEFINED, AFFORDABLE RENT CALCULATIONS (2006), available at http://cd12plan.net/Documents/AffordableHousingDefined.pdf.
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City’s Affordable Housing Fund, and that developers would be
required to pay building service workers prevailing wages if they
received tax incentives under the program.178
3.

Pratt Center For Community Development and Habitat
For Humanity

Other organizations that became involved in the advisory
process for the revamping of 421-a included the Pratt Center for
Community Development179 and Habitat For Humanity New York
City (referred to jointly as “Pratt”), which partnered together to
provide a recommendation report. 180 While the two groups did not
initially suggest their own proposed reforms, they nevertheless
mapped out the overarching issues that the Mayor’s task force
should consider.181 Pratt predicted that the Task Force would take
on important questions like whether to set a maximum cap on
benefits that developers could receive for any project, and whether
it would be more effective to expand the exclusion zone or do away
with it altogether by requiring all new building projects in the City
to set aside a certain number of affordable units. 182 Further, Pratt
178

Id. The Affordable Housing Fund, see infra notes 201–15 and
accompanying text, is a fund solely dedicated to financing the construction of
affordable housing stock. Prevailing wages, see infra notes 256–63 and
accompanying text, refers to the wages that maintenance workers in 421-a
buildings receive. The 421-a program as envisioned by CHPC, would not only
ensure that developers opting out of the 421-a program were indirectly
promoting affordable housing through their City property taxes, but also that
families earning moderate income were not also priced out of the City.
Additionally, CHPC’s proposal sought to spread the benefits of the 421-a
program to those actually working in 421-a subsidized buildings. Id.
179
Pratt Center for Community Development “works for a more just,
equitable, and sustainable city for all New Yorkers, by empowering
communities to plan for and realize their futures.” Pratt Center for Community
Development, About Pratt Center, http://www.prattcenter.net/about.php (last
visited Apr. 14, 2008). PCCD partnered with Habitat For Humanity on this
recommendation paper.
180
PRATT , SUBSIDIZE , supra note 39.
181
PRATT , SUBSIDIZE , supra note 39, at 9–10.
182
Id. Indeed, the Task Force duly took up these questions, determining
that the exclusion zone should be expanded, not removed completely, and that
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focused on whether the off-site negotiable certificates program
should be abolished, or if it would be better to keep and enhance
the existing program by setting higher minimum prices for
certificates and creating more oversight for these private
transactions.183
4.

Mayor Bloomberg’s 421-a Task Force

Reflected in the ultimate recommendations of Mayor
Bloomberg’s 421-a Task Force were aspects of the Pratt, CHPC
and HHN proposals outlined above.184 The Task Force determined
that the best route was to institute several substantive changes to
jumpstart the affordable housing prong of the program.185 The
most significant of these recommendations included: 1) expanding
the exclusion zone to include specific areas in Brooklyn and
Queens that were exhibiting rapidly growing populations and
increasingly affluent socio-economic areas;186 2) limiting 421-a
eligibility only to projects with at least six units;187 3) eliminating
the negotiable certificate program and replacing it with a dedicated
affordable housing fund;188 and 4) capping the “total amount of tax
benefits that any market rate unit” could receive in a development
that did not contain on-site affordable housing (i.e., developments
inside of the exclusion zone).189
there should be a maximum level for tax benefits a developer could receive. See
infra notes 184–89 and accompanying text.
183
Id.
184
See infra notes 168–83 and accompanying text.
185
See HPD, T ASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 2–3.
186
GEA Map, supra note 79.
187
HPD, T ASK FORCE, supra note 38, at 2–3, 4, 6–8. Limiting tax
incentives to buildings with more than 6 units effectively prevents developers
from building small-scale developments and receiving 421-a tax benefits; this
decision, however, all but forecloses the possibility for small developers to take
advantage of the 421-a program.
188
Id. The Affordable Housing Fund is a fund solely dedicated to financing
the construction of affordable housing stock. See infra notes 201–15 and
accompanying text.
189
Id. In turn, developers in the exclusion zone could not obtain large
numbers of negotiable certificates unlike previous developers such as Donald
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B. City Council Compromises

Bloomberg’s recommendations were formally introduced to the
City Council in early December 2006.190 However forward-looking
the proposed reforms may have been, some City Council members
nevertheless viewed them with criticism as not being sufficiently
progressive.191 Eventually, three other competing proposals
emerged as options for determining new contours for the program.
The first competing proposal was offered by City Council
Speaker Christine Quinn, which similarly called for eliminating the
negotiable certificate program and excluded three-unit projects from
obtaining exemptions.192 Her proposal went further than
Bloomberg’s, however, by allowing four- and five-unit projects to
remain qualified for exemption, calling for a comparatively
expanded exclusion zone and establishing a committee to regularly
review the exclusion zone boundaries.193 Moreover, only those
developers who devoted at least 20% on-site affordable housing to
families earning no more than 80% AMI would be granted tax
incentives.194
The second competing proposal was offered by Council
Members Annabel Palma and David Yassky, which advocated for
substantially simplifying the program by eliminating the exclusion
zone and significantly ramping up benefits to families earning lowincome wages.195 Council Members Alan Gerson and Letitia James
Trump who faced fewer obstacles before the task force’s recommendations were
implemented. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
190
Int. 472 (2006), available at http://webdocs.nyccouncil.info/
attachments/75424.htm.
191
Janny Scott, Challenging a Tax Break for Housing Developers, N.Y
T IMES, Nov. 30, 2006, at B3 [hereinafter Scott, Challenging].
192
Int. 486-A (2006), available at http://webdocs.nyccouncil.info/
attachments/75471.htm.
193
Id.
194
No more than 5% of these affordable units had to be available to families
earning between 60% to 80% AMI as calculated from the previous calendar year.
Id.
195
Id. Specifically, Palma and Yassky contended that both Bloomberg’s
and Quinn’s proposals only “[slightly] narrow[ed] the tax break” and that “pure
market rate development should be completely eliminat[ed]”. Scott,

TEACHING AN OLD POLICY NEW TRICKS

791

offered a final competing proposal.196 Most significantly, their bill
would have required developers to set aside 35% of on-site
affordable housing in a development at 60% AMI in order to
qualify for 421-a benefits.197
One of the major opponents to any changes in the 421-a
program was, unsurprisingly, the President of the Real Estate
Board of New York, Steven Spinola.198 Spinola asserted that any
new bill would “ ‘result in less production of housing, as well as
less production of affordable housing’ [and] that the changes would
alter the economics of development in certain neighborhoods,
limiting the incentive for developers to proceed with their projects
there.”199 Spinola and others urged reform of the negotiable
certificate program instead of abandoning it altogether.200
Challenging, supra note 191. Palma’s proposal would “get rid of this loophole
altogether” by completely eliminating the exclusion zone, thus compelling all
developers within the City to build on-site affordable units. Id. The
Palma/Yassky bill would not only have allowed projects with at least three
units to qualify for incentives, but also would have compelled developers
seeking 421-a tax incentives anywhere in the City to reserve at least 30% on-site
units as affordable. Int. 490 (2006), available at http://webdocs.nyccouncil.
info/attachments/75430.htm. This three-unit proposition would have allowed
smaller developers to take advantage of the 421-a tax incentives. Moreover, these
units could only be made available to families earning no more than 50% AMI
($35,450 for a family of four). Id. Lowering the eligibility level to 50% AMI
would arguably have realigned the program to benefit those families who were
most disadvantaged. Indeed, as compared to the previous proposals, the
Palma/Yassky recommendations were arguably more akin to the most
progressive proposals of the affordable housing advocates. See supra notes 133–
36, 139–40 and accompanying text.
196
Int. 487 (2006), available at http://webdocs.nyccouncil.info/
attachments/75428.htm.
197
Id. Like the Palma/Yassky proposal, the Gerson/James proposal would
have significantly raised the conditions for developers to meet before they could
obtain tax benefits under the program by increasing the required amount of onsite affordable housing and lowering the income threshold.
198
See Janny Scott, In Overhaul, City Seeks to Expand Lower Cost Units,
N.Y. T IMES, Dec. 21, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Scott, Overhaul].
199
Id.
200
Matthew Schuerman, Mayor Faces Pitched Battle Over Breaks for
Developers, N.Y. OBSERVER, Sept. 24, 2006, http://www.observer.com/node/
52713. REBNY only took a lobbying role in negotiations over the City
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C. City Council Legislation—Local Law 58

Ultimately, the City Council overwhelmingly approved the
bulk of Quinn’s proposal in Local Law 58 in December 2006.201
The Law included an expanded exclusion zone, mandated on-site
affordable housing units, and elimination of certain “of right” tax
incentives. First, the exclusion zone was expanded into certain
gentrifying areas in Brooklyn and Queens,202 and a boundary
review commission was created in order to assess the zone map
every other year.203 Moreover, within the zone, at least 20% of
units were mandated to be “on site” affordable units; i.e., “situated
within the building or buildings for which benefits . . . are being
granted.”204 As before, such units were eligible only for families
earning no more than 80% AMI. 205 Outside of the exclusion zone,
25-year as-of-right tax incentives were eliminated unless the
projects provided on-site affordable units or were built under
certain other government affordable housing programs.206
In addition to the on-site mandate and the elimination of the 25year as-of-right exemptions, several other elements of the 421-a
program were altered. Most importantly, certain projects were
precluded from receiving tax benefits, an Affordable Housing Fund
was established, and market-rate rentals had tax benefit caps. 207
Specifically, the City Council determined that only buildings with
four or more units would receive tax incentives, thus precluding
two- or three-unit projects from getting such benefits and ensuring
that developments benefiting from the tax incentives would
Council bill.
201
Scott, Overhaul, supra note 198. The measure for Local Law 58 passed
by a vote of 44 to 5. Mayor Bloomberg endorsed Quinn’s proposal as well. Id.
202
NEW YORK C ITY , C ODE §§ 11-245(a)(2–4) (2007).
203
NEW YORK C ITY , C ODE §§ 11-245.1(a–d) (2007).
204
NEW YORK C ITY , C ODE § 11-245(b-1) (2007).
205
NEW YORK C ITY , C ODE § 11-245(b-2) (2007).
206
DEP’ T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV ., 421-A LEGISLATION OVERVIEW AND
FAQ 1 (2007), available at http://home.nyc.gov/html/hpd/downloads/pdf/421aFAQ.pdf [hereinafter HPD, FAQ].
207
See NEW YORK CITY , CODE §§ 11-245(b); 11-245.1-a (2007); NEW
YORK CITY , C HARTER § 1805 (2007).
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advantage more low-income families.208
The Affordable Housing Fund that Mayor Bloomberg had
proposed209 in effect replaced the negotiable certificate system,
creating a different alternate means for financing affordable housing
development. The major goals of the Fund is to 1) direct affordable
housing funds to specific neighborhoods with the highest
percentage of “poor” households; 2) finance projects that would
create affordable housing; and 3) finance projects where developers
agree to preserve levels of affordability past the duration of tax
abatement.210 Additionally, in order to combat the deep
subsidization of luxury developments, the local law set a ceiling on
the maximum tax incentives that any market-rate unit could receive
at $65,000 per unit.211
Upon passing Local Law 58, Speaker Quinn pledged that “[t]he
bill will create even more affordable housing, encourage
development in communities where it is still needed and protect
taxpayer
dollars
from
over-subsidizing
new
luxury
212
development.” Even those who had introduced competing bills
voted for Quinn’s plan.213 Councilmember Palma recognized its
significance, musing, “We need to look at this piece of legislation[]
and look at the significant improvements [from the previous
program].”214 Yassky similarly observed that the law “[would]
result in more affordable housing and [would] eliminat[e] some of
the most egregious disparities in the property tax.”215

208

NEW YORK C ITY , C ODE § 11-245.1-b(c) (2007).
NEW YORK C ITY , C HARTER § 1805 (2007).
210
NEW YORK C ITY , C HARTER § 1805(4)(a–c) (2007).
211
HPD, FAQ, supra note 206, at 2. Indeed, prior versions of the 421-a
program allowed for unlimited tax incentives, which allowed for high-end luxury
developers to cash in. The exemption cap will certainly help to curb this
phenomenon. See supra notes 138–42 and accompanying text.
212
Scott, Overhaul, supra note 198.
213
Id.
214
Josh Burd & Gail Robinson, Tax Breaks For Affordable Housing,
GOTHAM GAZETTE , Dec. 21, 2006, available at http://www.gothamgazette.
com/article/searchlight/20061221/203/2067.
215
Id.
209
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D. The New 421-a Program: 2007–2010

The 421-a program amendments by the City Council had to
clear one more hurdle to become law.216 In New York state, a local
law related to a “state concern” such as housing may not be
unilaterally adopted unless “authorized specifically [by the State
Legislature] . . . or unless the State Legislature has specifically
granted such power to the City.”217 Thus, while the State
Legislature had the authority to simply rubber stamp Local Law
58, it also had the ability to modify it prior to enactment. 218 The
task of shepherding the bill through the State Legislature and
reauthorizing the tax incentives fell primarily to the Chairman of
the Housing and Buildings Committee and representative for the
53rd Assembly District in Brooklyn,219 Assemblyman Vito
Lopez.220
216

DOS, REVISING, supra note 38, at 3.
Id.
218
See id.
219
The 53rd Assembly District encompasses sections of Williamsburg and
Bushwick and is currently a lesson in socio-economic contradictions. The NYU
Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy describes Williamsburg’s
housing market as having “consistently high numbers of new certificates of
occupancy . . . . [P]rices continue to rise rapidly and the district now has the 3rd
highest rate of price appreciation in the City for 2–4 unit buildings.” FURMAN ,
HOUSING , supra note 8, at 58. Breaking with trends, Williamsburg “has seen
rates of subprime refinance lending decline steadily in recent years [and] median
household incomes increased significantly in the district since 2002.” FURMAN ,
HOUSING , supra note 8, at 58. In contrast, Bushwick’s housing market is
described as “exhibit[ing] somewhat divergent trends. On the one hand, the
neighborhood has benefited from high rates of price appreciation . . . . [but]
almost half of all new home purchase and refinance loans . . . are subprime, and
Bushwick suffers from consistently high rates of foreclosure. Bushwick also has
the highest rate of serious housing code violations in the City . . . .” Id. at 61.
220
As an Assemblyman for the State Legislature, Lopez was not involved
in the process at the City Council level. See Matthew Schuerman, Grinding
Sausage Late at Night: Albany Reforms 421a Program, N.Y. OBSERVER, June
26, 2007, available at http://www.observer.com/2007/grinding-sausage-latenight-albany-reforms-421a-program (“[T]he program, scheduled to expire at the
end of this year, needed state reauthorization before the City Council’s changes
took effect. That’s where Mr. Lopez came in.”).
217
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Opening Moves in the State Legislature

Initially, it appeared that Lopez was poised to tighten the
program’s requirements even more by restricting income eligibility
levels to 60% AMI (down from the City Council’s 80% AMI
level), mandating that at least 30% of on-site units be affordable
(up from 20%),221 and expanding the exclusion zone across the
entire City.222 Indeed, these modifications would not only have
shifted the demographic the program was aiming to serve, but also
would have made developers create more affordable housing in
order to receive the tax incentives.223
Lopez also questioned the method of pegging 421-a
affordability levels to the regional AMI calculation.224 While the
HUD-defined AMI for the entire City is currently $70,900, the
true AMI in Queens is closer to $49,000, and the AMI in
Brooklyn is only $37,000.225 As Lopez succinctly observed,
“AMI in Bushwick is [only] $22,000. Regional AMI is a joke.” To
Lopez, the “need [for moderate-income housing was] great but it
shouldn’t be at the expense of people in Bushwick or
Williamsburg.”226
In response to Lopez’s lofty ambitions of further restricting
the program, pro-development critics, including the Real Estate
Board of New York, argued that including middle-income families
221

See Atlantic Yards Report, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com (June
20, 2007, 6:29 EST).
222
Shane Miller, City Reformed It, But State Must Approve It, QUEENS
LEDGER, Mar 22, 2007, available at http://www.queensledger.com/
StoryDisplay.asp?PID=1&NewsStoryID=5470 (“Lopez, as well as affordable
housing advocates, have been critical of the city’s proposal, arguing that the city
shouldn’t subsidize market-rate housing, and that the entire city should be an
exclusion zone.”).
223
See supra note 195 and accompanying text regarding Int. 490.
224
Atlantic Yards Report, supra note 221. “The big dilemma we have,
with federal government getting out of public housing and Section 8 [housing
vouchers], it puts a real burden on the underclass, people who earn $15,000,
$18,000 a year. Affordable—it’s a relative thing” because AMI is calculated on a
region-wide level. Id.
225
Id.
226
Atlantic Yards Report, supra note 221.
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in the affordable housing calculation was necessary, and that any
further restrictions beyond Local Law 58’s program modifications
would stifle all development in the City. 227 In light of Lopez’s
proposed changes, even the Real Estate Board of New York turned
to back the City Council bill, as did parties from the other side—
including some affordable housing advocates who feared that
Lopez’s proposals would encumber smaller developers too
much.228
2.

The Outcome of Negotiations–A Revised 421-a Program

In the end, the New York State Legislature endorsed many
sections of Local Law 58, including eliminating the negotiable
certificate program and 25-year as-of-right benefits, creating the
Affordable Housing Fund, and capping the maximum amount of
incentives a project was eligible to receive.229 Notwithstanding the
strong indications from Lopez that the Legislature wanted
significantly stronger 421-a reforms, what eventually emerged was
legislation that melded the City Council’s law with parts of
Lopez’s vision, a compromise to ensure passage of the bills.230

227

As the Commissioner for the City’s Department of Housing
Preservation and Development asserted, “We agree we need low-income
housing, but we need more middle-income housing. . . .” Id. Critics who
claimed that revisions to 421-a would stifle development essentially used the
same threat that they had in 1985—that any additional limitations on
development in the City would scare off any further development. See supra,
note 96 and accompanying text.
228
See id.
229
See generally, N.Y. R EAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 2007).
230
Three Assembly Bills (A.) and one Senate Bill (S.) form the framework
for the changes to the program: A. 4408; A. 9293; A. 9305; and S. 6446. See
A. 4408-A, 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007); A. 9293, 2007 Leg., 230th
Sess. (N.Y. 2007); A. 9305, 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007); S. 6446,
2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008).
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a. Exclusion Zone Expansion
Although the Legislature declined to adopt a City-wide
expansion of the exclusion zone, it did greatly extend the zone to
more neighborhoods than were proposed by the City Council,
more than doubling the areas in the City where the 421-a laws
affirmatively apply. 231 In these areas, developers are now obligated
to create at least 20% on-site affordable housing if they wish to
build there and can no longer opt for negotiable certificates
instead.232 Outside of the zone, however, there is still no mandate
to create affordable units, and market-rate units rent level is still
determined by the prevailing rates in the area.233 As explained by
Lopez,
What we’ve done is expanded those 421-a zones to fifteen
more communities, eight more than the City Council
excluded. [Many] people strongly objected to the [broader]
City-wide [proposal] because they didn’t want to use the
concept of tax benefits as a way of mandating affordability.
[In turn, the zone, once only in Manhattan, was expanded
such that now] every borough has a program. [Community
231

N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW §§ 421-a(7)(a)(ii); 421-a(11) (McKinney
2007); A. 4408-A §§ 11(A-B), 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007). See also
Rachel Nielsen, Developers Incentives: Now With More Caveats, CITY LIMITS,
Aug. 27, 2007, available at http://www.citylimits.org/content/articles/
viewarticle.cfm?article_id=3395. In addition to the original Manhattan and
Greenpoint-Williamsburg zones, the new exclusion zone areas include: all of
Manhattan; portions of Claremont and Crotona Park in the Bronx; Downtown
Brooklyn as well as parts of Red Hook, Sunset Park, East Williamsburg,
Bushwick, East New York, Crown Heights, Weeksville, Highland Park, Ocean
Hill, Prospect Heights, Carroll Gardens, Cobble Hill, Boerum Hill, and Park
Slope; sections of Long Island City, Astoria, Woodside, Jackson Heights, and
the East River Waterfront in Queens; and, sections of St. George, Stapleton,
New Brighton, and Port Richmond in Staten Island. HPD, FAQ, supra note
206, at 1. See GEA Map, supra note 79.
232
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(f) (McKinney 2007).
233
See NEW YORK C ITY LOCAL LAW No. 58 §§ 1-2 (2006); N.Y. REAL
PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(11) (McKinney 2007), which legislate the exclusion
zones. Outside of these areas, though, there is no mandated affordability
restriction.
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Boards] picked areas that were prime for gentrification [in
order] to slow it down [and to] be inclusive of working
class people.234
b. New Income Eligibility Restrictions

In line with the City Council’s law and Lopez’s goals, the
eligibility level for the 20% on-site affordable housing units built
within the expanded exclusion zone was modified; now, income
levels are dependent on whether other government subsidies are
involved in the project.235 Developers within the zone seeking 421a benefits who build a project without any government assistance
are obligated to reserve at least 20% of their units as affordable for
families earning 60% AMI. However if those developers build a
project with at least twenty-five units and receive “substantial
assistance of grants, loans or subsidies from any federal, state or
local agency,” they are allowed to raise the income eligibility level
of the affordable units to an average of 90% AMI.236 Developers
with substantial government assistance who build a project with
less than twenty-five units can set income eligibility for the 20%
affordable units at no more than 120% AMI. 237
Under the non-government assistance option, the target
demographic has shifted downward, thereby allowing more families
earning lower incomes to qualify for affordable units under the
program.238 Whereas under prior versions of the law, only families
234

Interview with Vito Lopez, Assemblyman for the 53rd Assembly
District, in Brooklyn, N.Y. (Oct. 25, 2007).
235
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(c) (McKinney 2007), amended
by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008).
236
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(c) (McKinney 2007), amended
by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008).
237
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(c) (McKinney 2007), amended
by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008).
238
Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(i) (McKinney
2007) (“[Rent in affordable units must be affordable to] families whose incomes
at the time of initial occupancy do not exceed sixty percent [AMI] . . . .”), with
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW §§ 421-a(2)(a)(ii)(C), 421-a(2)(a)(iii)(D), 421a(2)(a)(iv)(A) (McKinney 2005) (“[Rent in affordable units must] be affordable to
families of low . . . income [as set by the local housing agency].”).
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making up to $56,700 would qualify for an on-site affordable
housing unit in a new building within the exclusion zone, that same
family would no longer be eligible—income is currently capped at
$42,540 for non-government assisted developments.239
The government assistance option, though, effectively increases
the average income eligibility level with respect to the affordable
units, from $56,700 (80% AMI) to an average of $63,810 (90%
AMI).240 This provision permits developers increased flexibility to
determine income eligibility levels for affordable units. 241 For
instance, a developer of an 80-unit project within the exclusion
zone that finances a project with substantial government assistance
could obtain 421-a tax benefits by setting aside ten units for
families earning $42,540 (60% AMI) and ten units for families
earning $85,080 (120% AMI). As a result, families earning less are
more likely to be shut out of affordable apartments under this
option simply because developers are permitted to seek renters
with higher incomes.242
239

See N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(ii)(A) (McKinney 2007),
amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008).
240
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(ii)(A) (McKinney 2007),
amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008).
241
Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(i) (McKinney
2007), amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008)
(“[T]wenty percent of the units [must be affordable to] families whose
incomes . . . do not exceed [60% AMI].”), with N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW §
421-a(7)(c)(ii)(A) (McKinney 2007), amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th
Sess. (N.Y. 2008) (“[If construction] is carried out with substantial assistance of
grants, loans or subsidies from any federal, state or local agency . . . twenty
percent of the units [must be affordable to] families whose incomes . . . do not
exceed [120% AMI] and, where the multiple dwelling contains more than
twenty-five units, do not exceed an average of [90% AMI] . . . .”).
242
Id. Regrettably, a developer building with government assistance can
entirely circumvent families earning incomes in the lower ranges and still meet
the requirement to obtain tax benefits. For example, a developer building a 20unit project could set aside four units at $85,080 (120% AMI) and satisfy the
provision. N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(i) (McKinney 2007),
amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008). Similarly, a
developer building a 100-unit project could meet the provision simply by
setting aside twenty units at $63,810, which equates to an average of 90% AMI.
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(ii)(A) (McKinney 2007), amended by
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Contrary to initial indications, the HUD-defined AMI was
wholly preserved in the new version of the 421-a program.243 It
was argued that the State Legislature lacked authority to narrow the
scope to the desired neighborhood or even City level because the
regional AMI calculations are a “federal standard that’s used across
the country [and the] federal government picks those areas
and . . . applies them.”244 Without the apparent authority to
restructure AMI itself, proponents of setting the level at 60%
AMI asserted that the move would effectively create the same
outcome by expanding affordable housing to families earning
incomes lower than prior versions of the program.245 As a result,
the AMI level was effectively modified in an attempt to achieve
the same outcome as shifting to a more localized AMI
calculation—targeting families earning incomes at the lowest levels.
That said, the substantial government assistance option only seems
to partially target such families because developers can spread
income levels for affordable units across a wider, and wealthier,
spectrum.246
c. Extended Rent Stabilization Period
The new 421-a amendments also stabilize the rents for
affordable units for thirty-five years247 even though the tax
incentives for developers expire at least ten years before that
time.248 This provision significantly lengthens the period of rent
S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008).
243
See generally, N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a (McKinney 2007)
(“area median income” cited throughout).
244
Public Hearing, supra note 49, at 54–55 (statement of Shaun
Donnovan, HPD Commissioner).
245
Public Hearing, supra note 49, at 59 (statement of Hakeem Jeffries,
Assemblyman for the 57th Assembly District).
246
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW §421-a(7)(c)(ii)(A) (McKinney 2007),
amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008). This provision
allows for affordable units to be, on average, 90% AMI for buildings with 25
units or more. Id.
247
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(b) (McKinney 2007), as
amended by S. 6446 § 2, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008).
248
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW §§ 421-a(2)(a)(ii), 421-a(2)(a)(iv)
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stabilization; in the past, rent stabilization simply ended when the
tax incentive period ended.249 “Prior to this,” Lopez observed,
“only the Mitchell-Lama [affordable housing] program had a longer
[rent stabilization] period of twenty-five years.”250 As a result,
developers receiving 421-a tax benefits may not increase the rent
for almost double the amount of time that they could before.251
This will create additional wealth for families earning low-income
wages in the form of reduced rent burdens over time.252
d. Community Preference Provision
Also included in the finalized amendments is a provision
demonstrating strong preference for those currently living in
neighborhoods with new 421-a construction to have preferential
treatment for housing instead of simply being priced out of the
area.253 Now, within the expanded exclusion zone, “residents of the
local community shall have priority for the purchase or rental of
fifty percent of the affordable units.”254 As Lopez has explained,
“if you build 100 units in Bushwick, twenty of the units [must be
designated] affordable. Half [of those, or ten units] must come from
community. You sort of become a stakeholder if you live in the
community,”255 and this provision works to retain some of those
stakeholders in the neighborhood by ensuring some units are set
aside for pre-existing community members.

(McKinney 2007).
249
See N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(2)(f) (McKinney 2005).
250
Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234.
251
Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(2)(f) (McKinney 2005),
with N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(b) (McKinney 2007), as amended
by S. 6446 § 2, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008).
252
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
253
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW §§ 421-a(2)(a)(ii), 421-a(2)(a)(iv)
(McKinney 2007).
254
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(6)(d) (McKinney 2007). It is
important to note that there is no oversight mechanism created by the new
legislation. It is unclear how exactly the City will monitor and enforce this
community preference ideal.
255
Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234.
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e. Prevailing Wage Preservation

An important and novel addition to the 421-a program was in
the area of wages for building service employees working in
buildings receiving 421-a tax incentives.256 Aside from of the
program’s focus on affordable housing, an associated concern was
that “while 80[%] of building service workers across the City earn
a prevailing wage, only 50[%] of such workers at buildings
receiving 421-a benefits do.”257 As City Comptroller William
Thompson described this divergence, “I think it is wrong for
taxpayers to assist projects like these where workers earn wages
that are barely livable.”258
Section 8(b) of the new 421-a provides that in buildings with
fifty or more units, “all building service employees employed at
the building . . . shall receive the applicable prevailing wage for the
duration of the building’s tax exemption.”259 Under this provision,
all “building service employees” working in 421-a buildings must
be paid the prevailing wage for that specific type of work. 260 As a
previous study determined, a “prevailing wage requirement [will]
boost the annual wages with benefits included for a building service
256

See N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(8)(b) (McKinney 2007).
NEW YORK CITY COMPTROLLER’S OFFICE, T ESTIMONY B EFORE THE
NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEES ON REAL PROPERTY T AXATION
AND HOUSING REGARDING T HE RPTL SECTION 421-A INCENTIVE PROGRAM 3
(2006), available at http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/press/testimonies/Jun0806-Testimony_Before_The_NewYorkState_Assembly421a.pdf.
258
Id.
259
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(8)(b) (McKinney 2007). The
prevailing wage provisions do not apply in buildings with less than 50 units, or
in buildings where at initial occupancy at least 50% of the units are deemed
affordable to families earning less than 125% AMI ($88,625). N.Y. REAL PROP.
T AX LAW § 421-a(8)(c) (McKinney 2007).
260
“Building service employees” are defined broadly as “any person who is
regularly employed at a building who performs work in connection with the care
or maintenance of such building.” N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(8)(a)(i)
(McKinney 2007). This may include “watchman, guard, doorman, building
cleaner, porter, handyman, janitor, gardener, groundskeeper, elevator operator
and starter, and window cleaner.” § 421-a(8)(a)(i). “Prevailing wages” refers to
the going in-state wage rate for building service employees working in different
capacities. See N.Y. R EAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(8)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2007).
257
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worker from approximately $36,500 to over $47,400 [in order to]
cover basic [family] needs such as food, housing and child care.”261
As Lopez explained, “We [have] created a precedent for
prevailing wages. We fought for fifty units; the City wanted 100
units.” Notably, the City’s 100-unit proposal, “would have [only]
created 350 prevailing wage jobs . . . . [S]ince most of the [421-a]
buildings [range from] 60–80 units, they all would have been
exempt [from the] prevailing wage provision.”262 Instead, “[at the
fifty unit level,] we will create 1,500 prevailing wage jobs . . . .”263
f. Disparate Treatment for One Developer
Shortly before the amendments were ready to be voted upon,
one extra provision was added to the new state legislation.264 The
provision initially stated in part that:
[A] project that includes at least twenty-five hundred
dwelling units . . . shall be eligible for benefits . . .
notwithstanding paragraph (f) of subdivision seven of this
section if in the aggregate twenty percent of the units . . .
are affordable to . . . families [whose average] incomes do
not exceed . . . seventy percent of the area median
incomes.”265
In effect, this section operated to create a significant loophole
around the on-site and income eligibility provisions placed on
exclusion zone developments elsewhere in the bill.266
261

Marnie McGregor, Testimony Before the NYC Council Housing and
Building Committee On Prevailing Wage Legislation, Apr. 22, 2005, available
at http://www.prattcenter.net/test-prevailwage.php.
262
Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234.
263
Id.
264
Ariella Cohen, Earlier report: Assemblyman gives Ratner a clause for
celebration, BROOKLYN PAPER, June 30, 2007, available at http://www.
brooklynpaper.com/stories/30/26/30_26bruceboost.html [hereinafter Cohen,
Earlier].
265
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(13) (McKinney 2007) (emphasis
added).
266
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(2)(f) (McKinney 2007); N.Y.
REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(1) (McKinney 2007).
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Instead of on-site affordable housing, this section only required
affordable housing “in the aggregate” over the project. 267 By
contrast to other developments that did not fit under this extra
provision, the addition of these three words allowed a project
falling under this provision to obtain tax incentives for the entire
project, even if affordable units were only in some of the project’s
buildings.268 This creates the potential for a sprawling, largely
market-rate unit project, with a segregated section for affordable
units, ultimately benefiting those with higher incomes (as well as
the developer).269
Further complicating matters, income eligibility levels for a
project under this provision were loosened to 70% AMI, up from
60% AMI for all other similarly situated developments. 270 In turn,
rents could be 10% higher in an applicable development than in
other 421-a developments. 271 As a result, the tax exemptions could
have been worth as much as $300 million in real estate tax
exemptions and increased rent to a developer whose project fit the
provision.272
Interestingly, special interests appear to be involved in this
dramatic new change to the 421-a amendments. Given the specific
wording of the above section, this special exemption only applies
to one large, high-profile development project already considered
controversial by some due to its comparative size,273 public cost, 274
267

N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(13) (McKinney 2007).
Id.
269
Id. This provision would also logically lead to socio-economic
segregation within the project as well. See id.
270
Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(c) (McKinney 2007),
with N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(13) (McKinney 2007).
271
Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(c) (McKinney 2007),
with N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(13) (McKinney 2007).
272
Ariella Cohen, Bloomy slams “Ratner carve-out,” BROOKLYN PAPER,
June 29, 2007, available at http://www.brooklynpaper.com/stories/30/26/30_
26ratnerbloomy.html [hereinafter Cohen, Bloomy].
273
When completed, Atlantic Yards will be comprised of a “basketball
arena and 16 towers containing 6,860 apartments on 22 acres in Prospect
Heights . . . .” David Lombino, Pressure Mounts to Curb the Size of Atlantic
Yards, N.Y. SUN , Aug. 29, 2006, at 1. Renowned architect Frank Gehry is also
planning the project. Cohen, Earlier, supra note 264.
268
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potential environmental impact,275 and its use of eminent domain to
secure land for construction:276 the Atlantic Yards Project under
development in Prospect Heights, Brooklyn by Forest City Ratner
Companies.277
Surely, Lopez later downplayed charges of favoritism by
claiming that the provision was not the real concern of critics.
According to Lopez, Ratner “really wasn’t the issue, the real issue
was income [levels to determine affordability] and [the expansion
of] geographical areas, but the smokescreen was Ratner because it
[was] a hot item.”278 Nevertheless, some former allies and
supporters of the bill thought otherwise. The reaction to what was
soon dubbed the “Ratner Carve Out” was swift and full of
indignation.279 For instance, Assemblyman Hakeem Jeffries, a onetime supporter of the Atlantic Yards project, declared that a “tax
break available only to the developer, was ‘offensive’ because it
promoted ‘economic segregation.’”280 Mayor Bloomberg asserted
274

See Atlantic Yards Report, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com (July
25, 2007, 06:53 EST) (“The state gave $100 million. The city gave $200
million. They waived the ULURP process. You don’t have to comply with the
zoning requirements, so you can build ten, 15, 20 stories higher than anybody
else, making additional money.”); Atlantic Yards Report, http://
atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com (Oct. 20, 2007, 06:37 EST).
275
Atlantic Yards Report, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com (Sept.
29, 2006, 06:50 EST).
276
Atlantic Yards Report, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com (Nov. 10,
2007, 06:42 EST).
277
See Matthew Schuerman, 421a Bill Gives Special Treatment to Atlantic
Yards, N.Y. OBSERVER, June 20, 2007, available at http://www.observer.
com/2007/421a-bill-gives-special-treatment-atlantic-yards (“The one exception
[to the new amendments] . . . can mean only one thing: Atlantic Yards.”).
278
In fact, Lopez received over $6,000 in campaign contributions in his
latest re-election bid for his Assembly seat from Michael Ratner and Karen
Ranucci, brother and sister-in law of Forest City Ratner Companies’ CEO Bruce
Ratner. Cohen, Earlier, supra note 264. However, in light of the complexity
and breadth of the law’s legislative history and full circumstances of its passage,
it is hard to conclude that such a small sum directed to one candidate was the
entire, or even primary, impetus for inserting the provision.
279
Id.
280
Assemblyman Jeffries went on to state, “enough subsidy has already
been given to this developer. There’s absolutely no reason to treat this project
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that the carve-out would “hurt the very people that everybody
talks about helping and gives some tax breaks to a developer that
doesn’t need them and which we didn’t have to do.”281
In the face of this mounting pressure, the extent of the Ratner
carve-out was revised. While the income level for affordable units
within the Atlantic Yards project remained at the higher threshold
of 70% AMI, two conditions now applied as a stop-gap
compromise, with the promise of further revisions in a subsequent
amendment: the project’s tax-exempt period was reduced, and
affordable units were mandated to be built concurrently with
market-rate units.282 Thus, the 421-a amendments passed
unanimously and the bill was signed into law.283 In his approval
message, Governor Spitzer cautioned that while he “share[d] the
Legislature’s desire to accelerate affordable housing production and
slow . . . gentrification[, he] also share[d] New York City’s
concerns about the impact of these three bills . . . on the level of
subsidies for the Atlantic Yards project.” Spitzer continued,
“Fortunately, the Legislature has agreed to further amend these

any more favorably than any other project that’s being built.” Atlantic Yards
Report, supra note 274.
281
Mayor Bloomberg added that he could “only hope that the Governor
stands up and vetoes” the bill. Cohen, Bloomy, supra note 272. “Even Bertha
Lewis of [the community reform organization] ACORN, a Ratner ally who is
contractually barred from saying anything negative about the project, said that a
state tax reform bill that exempted Ratner—and only Ratner—was ‘bad public
policy.’” Editorial, The Ratner Clause, BROOKLYN PAPER, June 30, 2007,
available at http://www.brooklynpaper.com/stories/30/26/30_26editorial.html.
282
See N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(13) (McKinney 2007),
amended by A. 9293 § 6, 2007 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2007) (mandating that
buildings with on-site affordable housing shall be eligible, provided that 20% of
the units in any given building “are affordable to and occupied or available for
occupancy by individuals or families the average of whose incomes at the time of
initial occupancy do not exceed [70% AMI]”); Governor Spitzer, Approval
Memorandum No. 40 Chapters 618, 619, 620, Memorandum filed with
Assembly Bill Number 4408-A (2007), available at http://public.leginfo.
state.ny.us/menugetf.cgi (type “A4408” in “Bill number” box, follow
“Approval No. 40 of 2007” hyperlink).
283
See Assembly Voting Record, A.9293, available at http://assembly.
state.ny.us/leg/?bn=a9293 (last visited Apr. 14. 2008).
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three bills with swift passage of . . . A.9373/S.6446.”284
A.9373/S.6446 was ultimately passed in early 2008.285 In many
ways, the amendment directly responded to the concerns of those
who had opposed the Ratner Carve Out: affordability levels within
Atlantic Yards are now mandated to be exactly the same as for
other developers working with other sources of government
funding, i.e., 20% of units affordable at an average of 90% AMI.286
Further, affordable units are required to be available in the same
buildings as market-rate apartments, precluding the possibility that
those units would be segregated to certain buildings within the
larger development.287 Additionally, certain amounts of affordable
units now must be built during each phase of construction, which
ensures that affordable units will be built as construction
progresses rather than just towards the conclusion of the project.288
A closer reading of the new amendment, however, still evinces
special interests at work. Those buildings within Atlantic Yards
that contain 20% affordable units are eligible for twenty-five years
of tax benefits.289 Astoundingly, buildings within Atlantic Yards
284

Governor Spitzer, Approval Memorandum No. 40 Chapters 618, 619,
620, Memorandum filed with Assembly Bill Number 4408-A (2007), available
at http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menugetf.cgi (type A4408 in “Bill number”
box, follow “Approval No. 40 of 2007” hyperlink).
285
S. 6446 § 7, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008).
286
S. 6446 § 7.
287
Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(13) (McKinney 2007)
(“[Benefits granted] if in the aggregate twenty percent of the units in such
development are affordable to . . . families whose incomes . . . do not exceed
[60% AMI].”), with S. 6446 § 7, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008)
(“[Benefits granted if affordable housing requirements are met] in the aggregate
for each successive fifteen hundred units of the project rather than for each
multiple dwelling containing such fifteen hundred units and in the aggregate for
the entire project rather than for each multiple dwelling in the project.”).
288
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(13)(a)(iv) (McKinney 2007),
amended by S. 6446 § 7, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008) (“[Benefits only
go to] units in which, in the aggregate for each successive fifteen hundred units
of the project rather than for each multiple dwelling containing such fifteen
hundred units and in the aggregate for the entire project rather than for each
multiple dwelling in the project.”) (emphasis added).
289
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(13) (McKinney 2007), amended
by S. 6446 § 7, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008) (“ The period of tax
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that do not meet this 20% affordability mandate are nevertheless
eligible to receive tax benefits for fifteen years. As a result, while
other developers are barred from receiving this fifteen-year tax
benefit if they do not meet 421-a requirements, those portions of
Atlantic Yards that do not comply with this provision are still
entitled to receive tax such benefits. 290 This extra period essentially
translates into hundreds of millions of dollars for Ratner that other
developers are simply not eligible for.291
III. A NALYSIS OF THE 421-A PROGRAM AMENDMENTS
“The original bill [I proposed was] my overall goal,” reflected
Assemblyman Lopez, “[but] the reality was I could have stopped
[affordable] housing totally by having the bill vetoed and then there
would be nothing . . . . There is a role for the tax breaks, but not at
the expense of affordable housing.”292 Even with legislative
compromises, there is little doubt that the amendments expand the
commitment to affordable housing when compared to prior
versions of the law. The new 421-a program decidedly points
toward a greater equalization of the existing disparities between the
program’s twin goals of housing development and affordable
housing construction293 and among its three policy objectives of
decent shelter, wealth creation, and efficient use of public funds. 294
The exclusion zone has been expanded to encompass more
neighborhoods, mandating on-site affordable units in more locations
across the City and curbing runaway profits for market-rate

benefits awarded to such multiple dwelling shall be the same as the period of tax
benefits awarded under clause (A) of subparagraph (iii) of paragraph (a) of
subdivision two of this section,” but parts of the project that do not meet general
requirements can still receive benefits that are “the same as the period of tax
benefits awarded under clause (A) of subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (a) of
subdivision two of this section.”).
290
Atlantic Yards Report, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com (Aug. 11,
2007, 06:25 EST).
291
Id.
292
Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234.
293
CHPC, ENHANCE , supra note 43, at 5.
294
See Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 531.
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developers. 295 In a similar vein, the negotiable certificate program
has been eliminated in lieu of requiring on-site affordable units. 296
Further, the eligibility levels with respect to AMI have been
somewhat reduced, thus ensuring that the program is more directly
tailored to help New Yorkers with lower income levels.297 This
target population now has a greater opportunity to retain more of
their earnings as affordable housing will allow them to pay closer to
30% of their income toward housing, instead of the 40-50% or
more that many did under the previous version of the program.298
As an additional wealth creation facet of the new 421-a program,
the prevailing wage provision will arguably help to ensure that
these employees earn comparable wages.299 The amended program
will thus be useful in enabling the City to realize Mayor
Bloomberg’s plan to “create and preserve 165,000 units of

295

See N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW §§ 421-a(11); 421-a (7)(f); 421-a (9)(c)
(McKinney 2007).
296
See N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(f) (McKinney 2007).
297
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(c)(ii) (McKinney 2007),
amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008).
298
Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(c) (McKinney 2007),
amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008) (providing tax
benefits either if 20% of units are rented to families earning 60% AMI, or, if the
developer finances the project with government assistance, if 20% of units are
rented to families earning an average of 90% AMI), with N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX
LAW § 421-a(2)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2005) (providing tax benefits if 20% of units
are rented to families earning 80% AMI). The extra savings for these families
comes from the fact that the base rent for affordable units is now, under the nongovernment assistance option, 30% of 60% AMI ($12,762), instead of 30% of
80% AMI ($17,016). No doubt, though, this change comes with a cost, as
eligibility to those earning over the 60% limit is eliminated, thus precluding
those families earning more than $42,540 from obtaining affordable housing
under this particular program. See id. Further, the option for developers to
finance projects through government assistance arguably leaves families earning
low-income wages in a worse off position than they were under the old version
of the program. N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(c) (McKinney 2007),
amended by S. 6446 § 1, 2008 Leg., 230th Sess. (N.Y. 2008). Under this
provision, developers are permitted to seek families earning on average $63,810
(90% AMI). See supra notes 235–42 and accompanying text.
299
See N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(8) (McKinney 2007).
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affordable housing” for 500,000 New Yorkers by 2013.”300
Notwithstanding these improvements, the new legislation begs
the same fundamental question as before in light of the dramatic
changes in the City’s economic vitality over the past 35 years, the
current landscape of the City’s real estate market, and the
program’s lackluster track record relative to affordable housing:301
whether the program’s trade-off of uncollected tax revenues for
increased affordable housing construction is now an optimal one.
Touting the legislation’s comparative improvements skirts the
issue; such assertions are hardly conclusive that the amendments
actually ensure effective use of public funds in the best manner
possible or even to a meaningful extent.
A. Decent Shelter
1.

No Quantifiable Performance Targets

One way to examine 421-a’s impact is by focusing on the
amount of affordable units created under the program for a given
period of time. Such analysis in the past has taken three factors
into account: 1) the number of affordable units built under the
program; 2) the total number of units built under the program; and
3) the total number of units built City-wide.302 This method is a
straightforward way of showing how much “decent shelter” the
program provides.303
One reason that previous attempts to measure the effectiveness
of the 421-a program have been so complicated is that there were
no specific performance metrics to serve as benchmarks for
whether or not the program was effective.304 Unfortunately, the
300

NYC DEP’ T OF HOUS. PRES. & DEV., T HE N EW H OUSING
MARKETPLACE: CREATING HOUSING FOR THE NEXT GENERATION , supra note
23, at 3.
301
See supra notes 116–62 and accompanying text.
302
IBO, FISCAL, supra note 44, at 4.
303
Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 532.
304
Compare N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(10)(a) (McKinney 2007)
(outlining monitoring procedures for the program, but no specific goals or
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new legislation does not address this basic problem. When asked
what successful results for the 421-a program would look like,
Assemblyman Lopez replied, “You will find thousands of units
that have 20% [on-site affordable housing units].”305 This
response, coupled with legislative silence as to a quantitative
goal,306 illustrates the lack of any specific, publicly defined
benchmarks or methodologies for which to meaningfully weigh
results. In a data-oriented era of accountability, a program that
stands to cost the public so much money but lacks adequate tools
to measure it is difficult to defend.
Absent quantifiable performance targets, it is, and will continue
to be, virtually impossible to determine whether the 421-a program
is efficient. As long as some indeterminate amount of affordable
housing is built, supporters of the program will publicize the
program’s success, and opponents will claim that the program is a
failure. Such post hoc rationalization prevents politicians, and the
public, from accurately measuring the program’s success; it only
fosters unfocused and ultimately unsupported debate on whether
the number of affordable units built exceeded, met, or fell short of
expectations. Unless and until there are clear performance goals, it
will also continue to remain unclear whether the program is meeting
expectations in terms of efficiently using public funds.307

benchmarks), with UNITED STATES OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET , T HE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS RESULTS-ORIENTED , A REPORT TO FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES 1 (2004) [hereinafter A REPORT TO FEDERAL EMPLOYEES] (“[T]o be
results-oriented, managers must ask themselves if the programs they administer
are achieving the desired result at an acceptable cost. If the answer is “no” or
“we don’t know,” they must do something about it, such as clearly define the
desired outcomes . . . [and] develop aggressive timeframes for taking
action . . . .”) (emphasis added).
305
Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234.
306
See generally, N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW §421-a (McKinney 2007);
NEW YORK CITY , CODE § 11-245.1(d) (2007). No quantifiable goals exist in
either the state or the local law.
307
See A REPORT TO FEDERAL EMPLOYEES supra note 304, at 1.
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2.

A Weak Yet Rigid Market/Affordable Mix Mandate

The modified 421-a program continues to promote a rigid
policy that imposes a strict building-mix percentage of affordablehousing to market-rate-apartments with no flexibility. Significantly,
maintaining the 80% market/20% affordable mix makes it
impossible to maximize the potential to create decent and
affordable shelter as compared to other proposals advanced by
affordable housing advocates and some members of the City
Council.308 Approximately 92,000 units were built under 421-a
between 1985 and 2006; roughly 4,900 of these were deemed
affordable.309 Given the on-site provision now in place, if another
92,000 units were hypothetically built under new program, 18,400
(20%) affordable units would be produced.310
By contrast, a more forceful program that mandated 30%
affordable units within the exclusion zone would produce 27,600
affordable units. Alternatively, even a flexible tax incentive program
that provided developers with increased incentives for developing
over the minimum standard of 20% would have likely yielded more
than 18,400 units.311 Instead, the new program eschews both more
stringent and more flexible standards, opting instead for the
identical, unyielding 80% to 20% mix of market- and affordablerate units as before. In failing to reflect either of the alternative
options, the legislation essentially precludes the possibility that
developers might tailor their projects to include more affordable
units.312
308

See supra notes 133–36, 139–40, 152–53, 155–56 and accompanying

text.
309

See 2007 HSR, supra note 53, at 16.
See N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(f) (McKinney 2007)
(mandating on-site units in order to receive 421-a tax benefits).
311
See CHPC, ENHANCE, supra note 43, at 8–9.
312
Id. For example, allowing developers the flexibility to increase the
proportion of affordable units to 40% in exchange for increasing the maximum
allowable household income of renters could result in higher levels of affordable
housing while simultaneously allowing developers to maintain their profit
margins.
310
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An Unfunded Affordable Housing Fund?

On its face, the addition of an Affordable Housing Fund sounds
like a fair replacement for a negotiable certificate program that
benefited market-rate developers far more than off-site affordable
housing developers. According to Councilmember Yassky, though,
the Fund is “nothing but smoke and mirrors” and is “utterly
without substance.”313 “The City already spends fair amount on
affordable housing,”314 Yassky pointed out, “and this [supposedly
new] commitment only means that the City will spend at least
this—[absolutely] not $400 million over and above what we
already spend. Where is the additional $400 million?”315 Indeed,
there is no additional funding; the Fund merely re-commits funds
for affordable housing that were already earmarked for promoting
affordable housing.316
Moreover, not only has the money not yet been allocated
according to the criteria outlined above,317 but also there is no
statutory timeline in which the money in such a Fund would be
spent or replenished.318 For instance, if money from the Fund is
stretched out over many years, the amount of affordable units built
from the Fund in a given year could be less than what could be built
using negotiable certificates. Alternatively, if a large portion of the
Fund is initially used on a limited group of affordable housing
projects, there is nothing to assure that there will continue to be
313

Telephone Interview with David Yassky, New York City Council
Member for the 33rd Council District, in Manhattan, N.Y. (Nov. 16, 2007).
314
Id. Such HPD-administered programs that promote affordable housing
include the Section 8 Program; Mitchell-Lama Housing; Low Income Housing
Tax Credits; and the Low Income Affordable Marketplace Program. See
Department of Housing Preservation and Development Home Page,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
315
Telephone Interview with David Yassky, supra note 313.
316
NEW YORK C ITY , CHARTER § 1805(1-2) (2006). (“[T]he commissioner
shall be authorized to establish or cause to be established an affordable housing
trust fund . . . such fund may be established through agreement with a public
benefit corporation authorized pursuant to the private housing finance law to
finance the development and rehabilitation of affordable housing.”).
317
Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234.
318
See NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW No. 58 § 9 (2006).
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money in the Fund in the future.319
The consequence of an unfunded Affordable Housing Fund is
that the Fund will likely provide for little more than what was built
through the negotiable certificate program.320 This suggests that in
addition to the Fund being under-funded, the money, if allocated,
runs a high risk of being even less cost-efficient than the older
version of the certificate program. According to Yassky, it may be
better to either revise the negotiable certificate program so that
developers are required to purchase a certain amount of off-site
certificates if they chose to develop within the exclusion zone, or
regulate the certificate system and enforce a substantially higher
price.321
B. Wealth Creation
1.

Setting Tax Incentives for Developers as the Default

Despite the substantive policy alterations to the 421-a program
since 1971,322 the underlying conceptual framework has not been
significantly changed by any new legislation. The statute’s default
position still holds that real estate developers have a right to tax
exemptions when building in the City. 323 This default position is
319

NEW YORK C ITY LOCAL LAW No. 58 § 9. Absent from the law is any
mechanism to replenish whatever money may be first established in the Fund,
such as devoting property tax payments from developers who chose not to take
advantage of 421-a to replenishing the Fund. NEW YORK CITY LOCAL LAW No.
58 § 9.
320
Telephone Interview with David Yassky, supra note 313.
321
Id. Indeed, Yassky’s counter to the removal of the negotiable certificate
program has merit only if the City devises a way to administer the negotiable
certificate program, instead of allowing a private market to govern the sale and
purchase of certificates.
322
See supra notes 75–115 and accompanying text.
323
N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2007)
(outlining the various “geographic exclusion areas” within the City). The
continued existence of these exclusion areas—essentially sections of the City
where developers must meet certain affordable housing obligations in order to
receive tax benefits—shows that the default scenario for purposes of the 421-a
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perhaps best evidenced by the so-called “exclusion zone”—only
within its boundaries are developers excluded from receiving the asof-right tax benefits unless they meet certain criteria.324 Outside the
zone, though, developers still receive benefits as-of-right.325
This illustrates a built-in fear that if the default position is
shifted, developers will simply not build because profits will not
be high enough.326 However, the premise that tax incentives are
necessary to entice developers to build in the City is flawed. Given
the lack of housing in the City 327 and the constant, rapid
population growth,328 it appears equally likely, if not more so, that
the market itself would generate development. As Assemblyman
Lopez suggested, “because the growth in population is so high [and
there is] limited land, [developers] will build no matter what.”329
Indeed, the majority of buildings constructed between 1985 and
2006 were built outside of the 421-a program.330 Given a more
restrictive current program, it is unlikely that developers will now
decide to build within the program.331 Even if there were City-wide
requirements for the use of 421-a, it is still quite likely that the
potential profits to developers would be large enough that they
would continue to build even without the tax incentive and with
some provisions of affordability. In fact, some large cities,
including Los Angeles and Seattle, demonstrate a more aggressive
approach to affordable housing through their development policies

program is still a situation where developers are granted tax benefits as-of-right.
324
Interview with David Yassky, New York City Council Member for the
33rd Council District, in Manhattan, N.Y. (Oct. 5, 2007).
325
See N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2007).
Since this section delineates areas where developers cannot receive tax benefits
without providing affordable housing, the parts of the City not covered by this
section are therefore still fair game for developers to receive benefits as-of-right,
without meeting any affordable housing criteria, should they choose to develop
there.
326
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
327
See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
328
See supra note 8.
329
Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234.
330
See 2007 HSR, supra note 53, at 16.
331
See supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text.
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without hurting their housing markets. 332
For example, in Los Angeles, California, there is no as-of-right
tax exemption for new development, and it only applies “for 100%
affordable housing development owned by not-for-profits.”333
Similarly, Seattle, Washington, statutorily compels developers to
build between 20% and 30% affordable units across the city. 334
Neither of these cities has seen decreased development because of
such aggressive approaches. 335 Subsequently, if developers in these
cities do not need additional inducements to build housing, it is
hard to justify 421-a on the basis of either general development or
affordable housing.
2.

The Exclusion Zone’s “Halo” Effect

Along with leaving the 421-a program in the pro-developer
default position, an additional concern implicit in the new
amendments is the effect on neighborhoods that fall on the edge of
the exclusion zone. Failing to enact a City-wide exclusion zone has
another consequence with respect to wealth creation, albeit an
unintended one. As a result of the exclusion boundaries, a “halo” on
the outer edge of some areas336 adjacent to the exclusion zone has
formed, where developers, in addition to current landlords, are not
bound by 421-a’s mandates and so could ostensibly fetch
increasingly higher market-rate rents due to gentrification.337 In
332

PRATT , U NDERSTANDING , supra note 34, at 6.
Id. As such, developers who develop market-rate units are simply not
eligible for tax exemptions; the exemption is only available for not-for-profit
developers who pledge that all of the units in a project will be affordable. Id.
334
Id.
335
Id.
336
See supra note 204 and accompanying text. Some of these areas
experiencing this “halo” effect include sections of Williamsburg and Greenpoint
in Brooklyn and Long Island City in Queens.
337
See N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421-a(7)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2007); See
also Laura Wolf-Powers, Pratt Center for Community Development, Why Jobkilling Rezonings Don’t Make Sense: A Response to the Manhattan Institute,
June 2005, http://www.prattcenter.net/pol-response.php (“[In the context of the
Greenpoint-Williamsburg rezoning process,] the spillover effects of new marketrate development in any particular such neighborhood are difficult to estimate,
333
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turn, long-time community residents in these areas face the
prospect of being forced out of their neighborhoods even though
the purpose of 421-a is to help families earning low-and moderateincomes.338 To be sure, it is one thing to provide affordable
housing, but quite another to mandate that developers should be
precluded from increased housing for more new people in the City.
That said, incentivizing such development by allowing developers
to take advantage of tax benefits and high rents in these areas
stands in direct contradiction to the goals of the 421-a program.339
As Assemblyman Lopez explained, the Legislature “picked
areas that were being gentrified [to be included in the zone], parts
of Williamsburg [for example]. Right now, as-of-right, they get a
tax break right next door” in an area adjacent to the exclusion zone
due to the lack of affordability provisions for areas nearby the
exclusion zone.340 “They rent [apartments for] $3000, $4000,
$5000 a month all throughout Williamsburg. Over 25 years,
[developers] are getting up to $100 million [in tax incentives], and I
think that is outrageous. It is really maximizing profits versus
coming back with a decent return.”341
While the exclusion zones mandate affordability standards, the
edges of the zones do just the opposite. Developments within the
Williamsburg-Greenpoint exclusion zone, for instance, force drastic
change on the out-of-zone waterfront, encouraging robust
development which is not restricted by 421-a, and further stands to
adversely affect the upland areas of Williamsburg and Greenpoint
as well, which are quickly becoming more and more populated with
new and wealthier residents. 342 Martin Needelman, the Project
Director of Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation A, observed, “As
more market-rate housing becomes available on the waterfront,
current upland landlords are looking to maximize their profits,”
but . . . the city’s Environmental Impact Statement projected that 2,510 people
could be subject to secondary displacement, a figure that activists on the ground
critiqued as far too low.”).
338
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
339
Id.
340
Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234.
341
Id.
342
See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.
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even if it means pressuring existing long-term low-income tenants
to move out of their apartments at the conclusion of their leases, or
using similar schemes to force them out before their lease is up.343
“This is a situation where supply is actually driving demand.
Waves of émigrés from Manhattan” are willing and able to pay
more than what residents of low- or moderate-income housing can
afford, and developers and landlords are similarly willing and able
to increase their profit margin by driving up rents on non-421-a
buildings within the exclusion zone, as well as on buildings just
outside of the zone.344 “These tactics,” said Needelman, “combined
with the rise of new market rate housing in the area, threaten the
availability of real affordable housing” and the viability of the
diverse community that has lived there for years.345
3.

Ill-Fitted AMI Calculation As Reflected By Atlantic Yards

As with the preservation of as-of-right tax benefits for
developers and the economic externalities created by the exclusion
zone, the special provisions for Atlantic Yards evince an intent of
the 421-a program that is not squarely in line with the rhetoric of
affordable housing. Special giveaways to individual developers only
undercut the program’s benefits to working-class families because
they reveal the program itself to be a tool designed to
disproportionately advantage developers, however superficially
modified.
While the amended Ratner Clause alone is problematic, it is also
equally symptomatic of a larger problem—the use of HUD’s
regional AMI calculation, which includes many wealthier sections
of the metropolitan area and thus artificially boosts AMI for the
entire City. 346 It may be difficult to decouple the City’s program
from HUD’s regional AMI calculation,347 but the federal
343

Telephone Interview with Martin Needleman, Project Director,
Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation A, in Brooklyn, N.Y. (July 3, 2007).
344
Id.
345
Id.
346
See supra notes 60–74 and accompanying text.
347
Public Hearing, supra note 49, at 55 (statement of Shaun Donnovan,
HPD Commissioner).
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government does not require the 421-a program to follow any
national guidelines because it is not financed by federal money.348
Narrowing the scope of the AMI to a City-wide level ($43,434)349
or even a neighborhood-by-neighborhood level seems entirely
plausible.350 Without any change in the scope of the AMI
calculation, though, the program remains poorly tailored to the
actual City-wide AMI, not to mention AMI at a borough or
neighborhood level.351
Brooklyn residents are in fact some of the least-benefited by
HUD’s regional AMI calculation, as illustrated by the Atlantic
Yards project. Because Brooklyn’s AMI is currently at $37,000,352
“only 40[%] (900) of the affordable units would be geared to
average Brooklynites.”353 For those living in the shadow of the
development, those numbers drop to a mere 24%—approximately
562 of the affordable units and 12% of the total rental units.354 The
reality is that Atlantic Yards is already being given many subsidies
above and beyond 421-a.355 It is questionable why Atlantic Yards
348

421-a is a combination of state and local legislation, and no city or state
funds are used because of the very nature of the program—the provision of tax
benefits to developers, in the form of tax exemptions, who choose to work
within the program’s criteria. See generally N.Y. REAL PROP. T AX LAW § 421a (McKinney 2007).
349
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
350
One reason why it might be difficult to decouple the 421-a program from
the HUD-defined AMI calculation is that portions of the program itself still
contemplate substantial government financing. See supra notes 235–42 and
accompanying text. As a result of this provision, developers receiving
substantial federal funds for their development would have to meet both the
HUD-defined AMI income level for the given federal program the developer was
receiving subsidies from, as well as the 421-a program’s standards. Id.; see also
supra notes 60–74 and accompanying text. As an additional concern, it might
also be difficult to determine the appropriate scope for the income-level
calculation, i.e., whether to set affordability levels based on a City, borough, or
neighborhood AMI.
351
See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
352
Miller, supra note 222.
353
Atlantic Yards Report, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com (July 25,
2006, 06:46 EST).
354
Id.
355
Atlantic Yards Report, http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com (June 6,
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should also get such additional, disproportionate and beneficial
treatment under 421-a for so little in return.356
CONCLUSION
“The way the City is situated now, you don’t need the 421-a
program . . . . It is not like it was [in the 1970’s when the City
was] losing people. [Then, there were] tens of thousands of vacant
lots and abandoned buildings. Now, the situation has changed—the

2007, 06:34 EST) (“[M]ore than half [of the financing for Atlantic Yards will]
come either directly from the government or from government-assisted resources:
$637.2 million in tax-free bonds to finance the arena; [$205] million from New
York City; $100 million from New York State; and $1.4 billion in tax-free
bonds to finance the affordable housing.”).
356
By digging deeper into the financing of Atlantic Yards, it becomes more
apparent that the project will not enhance affordable housing as much as its
promoters claim. Atlantic Yards will eventually receive subsidies not only from
the 421-a program, but from a 50-30-20 mixed-income program as well. This
50-30-20 program is provided through the N.Y.C. Housing Development
Corporation, an “issuer of bonds for multi-family affordable housing.” N.Y.C.
Housing Development Corporation, What is HDC?, http://www.nychdc.
com/about/about.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2008); Atlantic Yards Report,
supra note 353. Of the project’s 4,500 rentals, 50% (2250) will be market-rate,
30% (1350) aimed at those earning middle-income, and 20% (900) aimed at
those earning low-income. Five “housing income bands” comprise the 2,250
units considered affordable. 225 units at Band 1 (from 30% to 40% AMI), 675
units at Band 2 (41% to 50% AMI); 450 units at Band 3 (60% to 100% AMI);
and 450 each at Band 4 (101% to 140% AMI) and Band 5 (from 141% to 160%
AMI). It is curious that the 50% to 59% AMI range is completely absent from
the income bands. Atlantic Yards Report, supra note 353. Atlantic Yards will
also include some 2,360 condominiums. Id. Given that the income bands range
from 30-40% AMI to 141-160% AMI, it is critical that relative to the City’s
current AMI of $70,900, only 1350 of these units (or 30% of the affordable units)
will fall below this level; only 900 units (20%) will fall below the 60% AMI
level required for all other projects receiving 421-a benefits. Approximately
1,112 (less than 25% of total units) will qualify under Atlantic Yards’ inflated
70% requirement. Id. Since the income bands set a minimum and maximum
income level, it is not difficult to imagine that the developer will choose to rent
apartments to those families earning at the higher ends of these bands, thereby
depressing even further the actual number of truly affordable apartments to be
built.
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dynamic changed.”357 As the bill’s prime sponsor in the
Legislature, Lopez’s comment is particularly revealing and
somewhat paradoxical. The market is unlikely to voluntarily
provide affordable housing,358 and it may very well be that the new
legislation is better than none at all. Nevertheless, the amendments
are too little, too late. Tax abatements for constructing market-rate
housing are no longer necessary in today’s City; developers will
likely continue to build without extra incentives. As a result, 421-a
will remain a relic of the past unless significant revisions are made.
The program continues to misallocate public funds by giving away
too much in tax incentives for not enough public benefit in return.
Further, it only has an indirect expectation that affordable housing
will trickle-down to those who need it instead of directly
addressing the problem.
Rhetoric and political compromise aside, the fact that
affordable housing does not play a more robust role in 421-a is
problematic. Indirect promotion of affordable housing through tax
incentives to developers, as provided in the new 421-a provisions,
necessarily demonstrates that the program’s goals lie elsewhere: in
perpetuating a giveaway of public funds that would otherwise have
been collected from developers. Despite the improvements in the
revised 421-a program, it falls short in advancing affordable
development because developers’ profits are only marginally
curtailed at the expense of significant unrealized public benefits. 359
In contrast to the three overarching policy goals the law
purportedly advances—decent shelter, wealth creation, and
efficient use of public funds—the results reflects an anemic and
unjustifiable program that continues to put developers ahead of
families earning low- and moderate-incomes. As a result, public
funds continue to be used inefficiently because “decent shelter”
provisions are not as sufficiently robust as they could have been,
and “wealth creation” for families earning low-income continues to
be trumped by deference to developers’ profits.360
357

Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234.
Byrne & Diamond, supra note 13, at 530–31.
359
See Bradley Hope, Tax Abatement Debate To Be Revived, THE N.Y.
SUN , Feb. 28, 2008, at 10.
360
See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
358
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The City Council will have the first opportunity to reexamine
elements of the 421-a program in December of 2008.361
Assemblyman Lopez, the bill’s prime sponsor, has indicated that
he “would love to reevaluate in three years, to bring down the
income [requirement for eligibility for affordable housing] and make
it broader [more inclusive] than it is now. [His ultimate] objective
is a City-wide 70/30 program, and to make the 30% affordability
income level much lower.”362 The courage must be found to revise
the 421-a program so that it truly delivers on its overarching
premise and on what Jacob Riis maintained more than a century
ago was one of the principal responsibilities of government in this
critical area:363 well-defined, progressive legislation to ensure the
continued existence of affordable housing for the City’s families
earning low- and moderate-incomes.

361

See NEW YORK C ITY , CODE § 11-245.1(d) (2007) (establishing a
boundary review commission to determine exclusion zone boundaries in evennumbered years). Other sections of the 421-a program will expire in 2010. See
also N EW YORK C ITY LOCAL LAW No. 58 § 12 (2006).
362
Interview with Vito Lopez, supra note 234. This would ostensibly be
accomplished by: 1) modifying the mandatory market-affordable mix within the
exclusion zone to reflect 70% market-rate units and 30% affordable units; and 2)
maintaining the HUD-defined AMI as the benchmark for the program, but
lowering the AMI from the current 60% limit. Id.
363
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

